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Brownewell: Rethinking the Restatement View (Again!): Multiple Independent H

RETHINKING THE RESTATEMENT VIEW

(AGAIN!): MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT
HOLDINGS AND THE DOCTRINE OF ISSUE
PRECLUSION
The truth is, that the law is always approaching,and never
reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting new principles
from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from
history at the other,which have not yet been absorbed or
sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it
ceases to grow.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a federal district court, Maureen Johnson brought an action
against Mark Cohen to recover interest on a promissory note payable to
Johnson and signed by Cohen even though the principal was not yet
due. 2 In a bench trial, the court found for Cohen on two alternative,
independent grounds: first, that he was fraudulently induced to sign the
note by Johnson and, second, that Johnson signed a binding release of
Cohen's obligations to pay any interest on the note. The note then
matured making the principal due, and Cohen refused to pay. Johnson
filed a second suit against Cohen for the balance of the note.
If Johnson v. Cohen II is filed in a district court of the Ninth Circuit,
Cohen can use issue preclusion to prevent the second suit. The first
court determined that Johnson fraudulently induced Cohen to sign the
note, as one of two reasons supporting the holding that Cohen was not
liable for interest allegedly due on the note. Because the issue of
fraudulent inducement was actually decided, necessary to the judgment,
and contested between the same parties in a previous suit, the court in
Johnson II should find for Cohen by applying the doctrine of issue
3
preclusion.

I

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).

2
The following hypothetical is based on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
27, illus. 16 (1982). It is useful for illustrating the complex issues the courts struggle with
when trying to balance both equity and uniformity. This hypothetical and its application
are created from the author's imagination and are not intended to reflect any actual person
or case.
3
See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining the Ninth Circuit's analysis); infra text accompanying
note 25 (explaining the elements of issue preclusion).
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If, however, Johnson v. Cohen II is filed in a district court of the Fourth
Circuit, the case will proceed, and the parties will be forced to relitigate
the question of whether Cohen was fraudulently induced to sign the
promissory note. The issue of fraudulent inducement was not necessary
to the prior holding because it was only one of two independent
determinations leading to the conclusion that Cohen did not owe
Johnson the interest on the note. 4 More simply, Cohen could have won
the first case solely on the basis that Johnson executed a binding release
of his obligation to pay the interest or that Johnson fraudulently induced
Cohen to sign the note.
These two conflicting conclusions for the same problem illustrate the
current tension among the federal appellate courts regarding the effect of
issue preclusion when applied to multiple independent holdings. These
differing conclusions by appellate circuits lead to uncertainty and
potential forum shopping contrary to uniformity, the basis of the
5
American federal court system.
The principle of issue preclusion states that later courts should honor
6
a prior court's determination of a matter that was actually litigated.
Multiple independent holdings implicate the existing doctrine of issue
7
preclusion through the ambiguity of the "necessarily decided" prong.
The Second Restatement of Judgments attempted to remedy the problem
posed in the hypothetical by disallowing the application of issue
preclusion when the first holding was based on multiple independent
grounds. 8 However, the Restatement's remedy does not adhere to the

4

See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining the Fourth Circuit's analysis).

5

See ALAN D. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-3 (1969).

In this hypothetical,

Johnson would want to take her first case to the Fourth Circuit, instead of the Ninth
Circuit, for fear that an alternative judgment might preclude her from bringing a
subsequent claim for the principal of the note. Cohen, however, would hope that Johnson
brought the case in the Ninth Circuit. If Johnson brought the case in the Fourth Circuit,
then Cohen may only defend on the basis that Johnson fraudulently induced him to sign
the note because the Fourth Circuit's current rule on issue preclusion could bring him back
to court when the principal became due and force him to relitigate. Cohen will not assert
useless defenses due to cost and time concerns. See infra Part III (discussing the circuit
split); infra Part IV (analyzing the issues affected by this split).
6

18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4416, at 136

(1981).
7
See infra notes 31-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "necessarily
decided" prong of issue preclusion and its implication by multiple independent holdings.
8
See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Second
Restatement rule. The First Restatement suggested that when a judgment is based on
alternative independent grounds, both may be precluded in future litigation. See
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policy considerations or the purpose behind issue preclusion and
warrants a restructuring of the Second Restatement rules and a new
application of this doctrine. 9
Part II of this Note presents the doctrine of issue preclusion, focusing
on multiple independent holdings, and explains the jurisprudence of
Supreme Court decisions and the Restatements of Judgments. 10 Part III
charts the current circuit split and explains how each of the circuits has
resolved this issue." Part IV illustrates the concerns created by this split
and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each circuit's treatment of
the problem. 12 Finally, Part V proposes an amendment to the Second
Restatement of Judgments. 13 The amendment creates an exception to the
general rule of issue preclusion, which applies when the previous
decision is based on multiple independent holdings and the party
objecting to the application of issue preclusion can prove that without
14
the exception, injustice will result.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND OF ISSUE PRECLUSION

Part II.A presents the definition of issue preclusion, particularly how
it differs from the doctrine of res judicata.1i This Part also explores the
policy considerations that make issue preclusion a necessary and vital
doctrine in the state and federal court systems.' 6 Part II.B traces the
history of issue preclusion by analyzing the Supreme Court's treatment
of the doctrine, as well as the changing philosophy of the Second
17
Restatement of Judgments.
A. Definitions and Elemental Considerations
Res judicata is a judicially created doctrine that has been
implemented by the courts without reference to either statutory or

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 cmt. n (1942) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FIRST)].

On the other hand, the Second Restatement offers the rule that multiple independent
holdings are not precluded in future litigation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 27 cmt. i (1982) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
9
See infra Part V.
10 See infra Part I.
11 See infra Part III.
12 See infra Part TV.
13 See infra Part V.
14 See infra Part V.
15
See infra Part II.A.
16 See infra Part II.A.
17 See infra Part II.B.
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Res judicata literally means "a thing
constitutional principles.' 8
adjudicated." 19 The term res judicata encompasses both claim preclusion
and issue preclusion, although claim preclusion is often considered the
"true res judicata."20 The elements of claim preclusion are as follows: (1)

18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4403, at 11. Because res judicata is a judge-made
doctrine, the parties can mutually waive its application. 18 id. at 13. Some federal statutes
invoke the doctrine of res judicata. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d)(2000) ("[A] final judgment or decree
rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United
States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of
the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States."); 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000). Section 1346(b) provides that the district courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages.., for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment ....
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). See also id. § 2519 ("A final judgment of the United States Court of
Federal Claims against any plaintiff shall forever bar any further claim, suit, or demand
against the United States arising out of the matters involved in the case or controversy.");
18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4403, at 19.
19 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (7th ed. 1999). Res judicata is defined as
1. An issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision. 2.
An affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating a
second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the
same transaction or series of transactions and that could have been-but
were not-raised in the first suit.
Id. Res judicata is also defined as
The principal that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits
without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusive of rights, questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties and
their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (3d ed. 1969).
20 Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th Cir.
1978). Claim preclusion treats a judgment as the full measure of relief between the same
parties and the same cause of action. Id. When a plaintiff obtains a favorable judgment, his
claim "merges" in the judgment. Id. When a defendant obtains a judgment in his favor,
the judgment acts as a bar against the plaintiff from bringing a future claim. Id. Whether
or not the issue was raised at trial, claim preclusion extends to all issues relevant to the
same claim between the parties. Id.; see 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4402, at 13. Many
Supreme Court decisions seek to emphasize the distinctions between issue preclusion and
claim preclusion. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4416; see also S. Pac. R.R. v. United
States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897). In South Pacific Railroad,Justice Harlan stated,
The general principal announced in numerous cases is that a right,
question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be
disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies;
and, even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right,
question, or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties
18
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an earlier decision on the issue, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and
(3) the involvement of the same parties or parties in privity with the
original parties. 21 The aim of claim preclusion is to avoid multiple suits
on identical disagreements between the same parties, which would lead
to courts determining the same controversy twice. 22 Claim preclusion
can bar issues that were not litigated if they were part of the claim
between the parties in the first action. 23
The second doctrine under res judicata is issue preclusion, or
collateral estoppel, which provides that later courts should honor the
first holding regarding an issue that has actually been litigated. 24 A
party invoking issue preclusion must prove three necessary elements:
(1) that the issue was actually decided, (2) that it was necessary to the
judgment, and (3) that the person against whom the estoppel will work

or their privies be taken as conclusively established, so long as the
judgment in the first suit remains unmodified. This general rule is
demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been
established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the
settlement of matters capable of judicial determination.
Its
enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for the aid
of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights
of person and property if, as between parties and their privies,
conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals in
respect of all matters properly put in issue, and actually determined by
them.
168 U.S. at 48-49. See Christopher John Heller, Collateral Estoppel-Offensive Use of Equity
Finding Allowed in Subsequent Law Action. Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); 3
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 103, 105 (1980). Although res judicata and collateral estoppel
are often used interchangeably, they are two distinct principles. Id. Further, res judicata is
claim preclusion and collateral estoppel is issue preclusion. Id.
21 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1312. The general rule of claim preclusion
states that
A valid and final personal judgment is conclusive between the parties,
except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, the claim is extinguished
and merged in the judgment and a new claim may arise on the
judgment (see § 18);
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, the claim is
extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on that claim
(see § 19); ....

RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 17. See also 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4406,
at 43-48.
22 Kaspar,575 F.2d at 535-36.
23
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 17.
24 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4402, at 6, 136. Unlike claim preclusion, issue
preclusion does not prohibit litigation of matters that have never been argued or decided.
Id. at 136.
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25
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.
The basic definition of issue preclusion is consistent among the federal
courts; however, the secondary question of how to define the issue, or
whether an issue is "necessary to the judgment," is where inconsistencies
26
develop.

Courts have generally held that a determination that does not
logically support the judgment and is not essential to the judgment may
be relitigated in subsequent actions.27 The Second Restatement of
Judgments suggests a series of questions to determine whether the issue
in a subsequent suit is the same as that in the previous litigation. 28 If the
initial case involves a bench trial, the judge's findings of fact can be used
to discover the decided issues. 29 Likewise, in the case of a jury trial, the
interrogatories to the jury or a special verdict may be helpful because
30
explicit findings of fact are not provided.

25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27; Jo Desha Lucas, The Direct and Collateral
Estoppel Effects of Alternative Holdings, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 701, 701 (1983).
26 See Lucas, supra note 25, at 702-03.
27
Id. at 702. There are three reasons for this general rule. Id. First, a finding of fact or a
determination of an issue that does not support the judgment is analogous to dicta. Id.
Second, a nonessential finding is unreliable, since it may have been made with less scrutiny
because the ultimate result of the case did not depend on its determination. Id. Finally, a
decision that is not necessary to the judgment is not available for appeal. Id.; see Parklane
Hosiery Co.v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Irving Nat'l Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1926). The
Second Circuit stated that, even if the losing litigant takes an appeal, the winning litigant
might not diligently oppose a claim or error since the winning litigant could demur and
rely solely on the argument that the claimed error was not essential to the judgment.
Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1970).
28
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. c. To determine whether the issues are
the same, the Second Restatement suggests asking:
Is there a substantial overlap between the evidence or argument to be
advanced in the second proceeding and that advanced in the first?
Does the new evidence or argument involve application of the same
rule of law as that involved in the prior proceeding? How closely
related are the claims involved in the two proceedings?
Id.
29
VESTAL, supra note 5, at V-189.
30
Id. In addition to interrogatories or a special verdict, the pleadings may also be used
to determine the issues, but pleadings are not conclusive since there is the possibility of
trial. Id. at V-189 to V-190. In both state and federal practice, there is the possibility that
the issues actually tried in the case will not be limited to those in the pleadings. Id. at V190; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (stating that a party is allowed to "amend the party's pleading
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served ....
Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading by leave of court or by written consent
of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires"). Ultimately,
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The second problem in applying issue preclusion is the requirement
that the issue must be "necessarily decided," which will be the focus of
this Note. 31 It is well settled that, if a court finds it is unable to decide a
case on the merits due to a procedural defect, yet does so anyway, the
32
decision is not precluded from relitigation by a proper tribunal.
Therefore, dicta or a jury's special verdict, both of which are not binding
to the controlling legal issues, will not be precluded from relitigation by
the application of issue preclusion. 33 Furthermore, if a court's decision
could have been based on narrower grounds than those actually chosen,
the resolution of multiple issues was unnecessary to the judgment and
will not bind the parties in future litigation.34 Multiple independent
35
holdings further challenge the "necessarily decided" prong.
A case decided on multiple independent holdings differs from a
nonessential determination because multiple grounds for a decision are

the second court will have to examine the first suit in its entirety to determine the issues
necessarily decided. VESTAL, supra note 5, at V-190. This means that the court in the
second suit may have to examine the first suit's record to determine what matters were in
issue between the parties and, therefore, necessary to the decision. Id.
31
See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4421, at 192-209 (explaining the "necessarily
decided" prong as allowing issue preclusion to attach only to determinations that were
necessary to support the judgment of the first action). There are two reasons for this
requirement. Id. First, the tribunal may not have taken sufficient care in deciding an issue
that is not necessary to the judgment. Id. Second, appellate review may not be available to
ensure the quality of the decision. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. h.
This issue was not a problem until the 1980s. Lucas, supra note 25, at 701, 703. The broad
concept of "cause of action" and compulsory counterclaim rules limit the circumstances in
which an issue can arise in subsequent litigation between the parties. Id. Additionally,
through the doctrine of mutuality, a stranger to the litigation could rarely plead the
affirmative defense of issue preclusion. Id.
32
18 WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 6, § 4421, at 207 (citing Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481
F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). Stebbins filed a class action against the Insurance Company
of North America ("INA") claiming racial discrimination. Stebbins, 481 F.2d at 503. The
trial court granted the summary judgment motion by the INA on two separate grounds. Id.
at 505. The plaintiff, Stebbins, refused to file an application for employment with the INA,
and he lacked financial prudence, candor, stability, and interest in the business world so
that no prudent insurance company could reasonably employ him. Id. Stebbins then filed
an action against the INA and its subsidiaries, which the district court dismissed under res
judicata principles. Id. The court of appeals examined this case under principles of
collateral estoppel. Id. at 506. The court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not
apply since it would have the effect of forcing Stebbins to appeal even though he could
institute a new action by filing a new application. Id. at 508.
33
18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4421, at 194.
34
18 id. at 207.
35
Lucas, supra note 25, at 703.
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not dicta.3 6 Second, there is no reason why the judge, the jury, or the
parties would believe that the holdings are less important or worthy of
less scrutiny.3 7 Finally, all of the determinations are reviewable on
38
appeal, unlike unnecessary commentary by the court.
There are four situations in which multiple independent holdings
are possible. 39 First, if a plaintiff asserts and fully develops more than
one legal theory to support a single claim for relief and the court finds
for the plaintiff on more than one theory, multiple independent holdings
exist.40 Second, the plaintiff may plead more than one instance of
conduct that gave rise to the claim.41 Third, certain claims require the
plaintiff to prove multiple elements, and the defendant will prevail if the
plaintiff fails to establish one or more of the elements. 42 Finally, a
defendant can deny the allegations of the complaint, as well as plead an
affirmative defense or some other defense to prevail, any of which, in
conjunction with a negative finding for the plaintiff, would create
43
multiple independent holdings.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38
39
40

Id.
Id. at 702.
Id.; see, e.g., Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 964, 980-87

(3d Cir. 1975).

41 Lucas, supra note 25, at 702; see Tanker Hygrade No. 18 v. United States, 526 F.2d 805,
809-12 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (holding that a decision based on the cumulative effect of oil spills
precludes relitigation of the individual spills as distinguished from Halpern v. Schwartz, 426
F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1970), in which the grounds for the decision were independently
supported).
42 Lucas, supra note 25, at 702-03. A common example of requiring a plaintiff to prove
multiple elements of a claim is a negligence claim where the plaintiff must prove a duty
owed by the defendant, a breach of that duty, and damages caused by the breach of that
duty. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 8, § 68 cmt. n, illus. 8.
A and B, while operating automobiles, have a collision. A brings an
action against B, alleging that the collision was caused by the
negligence of B. B denies that he was negligent and alleges that the
collision was due to A's negligence. The jury in answer to the
interrogatories finds that the collision was caused by the negligence of
A and that B was not negligent and gives a verdict for B on which
judgment is entered. Thereafter B brings an action against A to recover
for the damage to his automobile resulting from the collision. The
judgment in the prior suit is conclusive that the collision was caused
by the negligence of A and was not caused by the negligence of B.
Id.
43 Lucas, supra note 25, at 703. The hypothetical in the introduction of this Note
illustrates an example of a defendant offering two defenses and the court ruling on both,
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After a court determines that the elements of issue preclusion are
established, it must consider whether an injustice exception applies
before invoking the doctrine of issue preclusion." A few rare situations
exist in which applying issue preclusion is inappropriate, despite the fact
that all of the elements are present.45 Such situations include those in
which there are changes in the legal climate, concerns with the impact of
the decision on nonparties, changes in the context in which the issue
arose, parties who lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate,
constitutional defects that existed in the first proceeding, and categories
of litigants who need special treatment. 46 Finally, when a losing party

either of which standing alone would be sufficient for the defendant to prevail. See supra
Part I.
44
18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4426, at 264-65. Claim preclusion might function
better than issue preclusion with an unfairness exception, since claim preclusion can
prohibit litigation of an issue that was never decided. Id. at 268. A general injustice
exception should be applied as narrowly as a claim preclusion exception when issue
preclusion is used in conjunction with claim preclusion. Id. However, in other cases, issue
preclusion may allow a broader exception in unusual circumstances. Id. The Second
Restatement provides five exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion:
(1) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter
of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action; or
(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that
are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in
order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal
context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; or
(3) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the
quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts
or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them; or
(4) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly
heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial
action than in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his
adversary; or the adversary has a significantly heavier burden than he
had in the first action; or
(5) There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the
issue (a) because of the potential adverse impact of the determination
on the public interest or the interests of persons not themselves parties
in the initial action, (b) because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the
time of the initial action that the issue would arise in the context of a
subsequent action, or (c) because the party sought to be precluded, as a
result of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances,
did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and
fair adjudication in the initial action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 28.
45
18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4426, at 266-67.
46
18 id. For example, the court in Moch v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board noted
that, when public policy demands an exception to the rule of finality, it is inappropriate to
apply issue preclusion in an effort to uphold the general policy of the rule. 548 F.2d 594,
598 (5th Cir. 1977). In this case regarding a claim by plaintiffs that their votes were being
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lacked an incentive to litigate the issue at the first trial and the stakes are
much higher in the second trial, the application of issue preclusion may
47
not be fair or appropriate.
B. Policies that Drive Issue Preclusion
The purpose of res judicata is firmly based in public and private
policy.48 Res judicata is designed to protect our court system from the
corrosion that would occur if the same issues or claims were litigated

diluted through districting, the Fifth Circuit noted that from 1972 to 1977 the law had
changed. Id. The court reasoned that this would make an application of collateral estoppel
in the 1977 case, using the 1972 decision, unjust. Id. This case also stands for the
proposition that an unconstitutional districting could cause a negative impact on future
voters and that collateral estoppel could not prevent curing this impact on other parties. Id.
Another injustice exception is the "constitutional defect." 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 6, § 4426, at 267. In Smith v. United States, the notice given to Smith was so inadequate
that the court refused to give collateral estoppel effect to the prior judgment. 403 F.2d 448,
450 (7th Cir. 1968). Since Smith was, in essence, denied his opportunity to have his day in
court, the Seventh Circuit found that Smith was entitled to litigate his claim despite
collateral estoppel. Id. at 451.
A final injustice exception is "changes in context." 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6,
§ 4426, at 266. In Title v. Immigration and NaturalizationService, the court noted the difficulty
when determinations made under one statute are considered binding under a different
statute. 322 F.2d 21, 25 n.ll (9th Cir. 1963). Since the context under which the provisions of
the statutes were considered could differ, a determination under one statute should not
necessarily preclude litigation of the issue under a different statute. Id.
Because the legislative history of two statutes is always different,
because the purposes of two statutes are never the same, and because
the context of provisions must be taken into account, the conclusion is
probably sound that a determination under one statute need not
necessarily be res judicata when the same question arises under
identical words of another statute.
Id. (citing 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 578 (1958)).

47 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4423, at 221. Sometimes the stakes in the first action
may be so small that it would not be reasonable to expend the time and money needed to
vigorously defend an action. Id. For example, few litigants would spend $5000 defending
a $500 claim unless there was reason to foresee that the issue would be relevant in a
subsequent suit. Id.
48 18 id. § 4403, at 11-22. The Supreme Court stated in ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore that
res judicata has the dual effect of promoting certainty for litigants by eliminating the
burden of relitigating identical issues that have already been decided, as well as promoting
judicial economy by preventing needless litigation. 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). These
purposes are captured in the Latin maxims: "interest reipublicaeut sit finis litium" and "nemo
debet bis vexari pro eadem causa." 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 6, § 4403. The foregoing Latin
maxims are translated respectfully as: "it is in the interest of the state that there be a limit
to litigation" and "no one ought to be twice troubled for one and the same cause." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1647, 1661. "The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based
on the policy of limiting litigation to one fair trial on an issue." Heller, supra note 20, at 105.
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twice with inconsistent results. 49 Res judicata also preserves the courts'
time by preventing repetitious litigation of previously decided claims
and issues.5 0 Furthermore, parties should only have "one bite at the
apple," which means that wealthy litigants cannot continue to retry a
case until they win against a poorer opponent5s
Despite these
significant policy justifications, issue preclusion does not exist without
52
potential negative effects.
Issue preclusion's effect on litigants' behavior warrants consistent
application of this doctrine.5 3 Issue preclusion is determinative in a
subsequent action when the party arguing for preclusion succeeds.54
Another significant effect is that litigants must take into account the
possibility of preclusion in future litigation when tailoring the first
lawsuit.5 5 The zealous nature by which a party argues a case in the first
instance is significantly affected by a court's rule on the preclusive effects
of multiple independent holdings.5 6 If the applicable preclusion law
holds that none of the alternative holdings will be precluded in

18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4403, at 20-45. "It is easier to live with the abstract
knowledge that our imperfect trial process would often produce opposite results in
successive efforts than to accept repeated concrete realizations of that fact." 18 id. at 23-24.
50
18 id. at 13-15. The purpose of collateral estoppel is two-fold. Id. It is to protect
litigants from the burden of relitigation of identical issues and to promote judicial economy
through preventing needless litigation. Heller, supranote 20, at 106.
51 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4403, at 15-17; Laura Gaston Dooley, The Cult of
Finality: Rethinking CollateralEstoppel in the Postmodern Age, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 43, 60 (1996).
52
18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4416, at 142. One negative risk of issue preclusion is
that the first litigated determination could be wrong. Id. Second, if the possibility of future
litigation is unforeseen, then the parties may not vigorously defend the case. Id. Third,
issue preclusion could expand rather than reduce litigation. Id. Parties may feel the need
to exhaust all possible issues in fear of issue preclusion and cause more "cautionary"
appeals. Id. Finally, "the values of issue preclusion can be served effectively only by clear
rules." Id. Without clear rules, an invitation of second litigation exists to test the limits of
issue preclusion. Id.
53
Howard M. Erichson, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion,96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 950 (1998).
54
Id. Parties will try to tailor their pleadings to either avoid or implicate the issue
preclusion doctrine. Id.
55
Id. Erichson breaks down the considerations of litigants at the first case into seven
categories: zeal and appeal, delay, joinder, settlement, other litigation decisions (including
consolidation, compulsory joinder, and class certifications), nonparty participants, and
litigation behavior and the first case's policies. Id. at 950-63.
56
See generally id. at 950-52 (stating that the rational litigant will expend more resources
when the stakes are higher). In a jurisdiction where multiple independent holdings are
entitled to issue-preclusive effect, a party with a strong case on one theory may not allocate
much effort on alternative theories. Id. at 952. On the other hand, if alternative holdings
are not precluded in future litigation, a party will vigorously litigate each alternative
theory. Id.
49
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subsequent actions, then a party with a strong case on one theory will
not vigorously support any other contentions. 57 If, however, the
applicable law allows alternative holdings to be precluded, then the
party would be concerned with each theory and zealously argue each
58
potential ground for the decision.
C. The Influence of the Supreme Court on the Doctrine of Res Judicata
The Supreme Court has dealt with various aspects of issue
preclusion and res judicata.5 9 Courts at one time held that a party not
bound by a prior decision could not benefit from issue preclusion by
estopping a person who was a litigant in a former case involving the
same decision.6° In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation,61 the Supreme Court rejected the concept of mutuality in
collateral estoppel. 62 The Court found that unfairness does not result
from nonmutual collateral estoppel and that, in fact, such an estoppel

57 Id.
5
Id. "Litigants may also decide whether or not to appeal adverse decisions based on
the governing law of issue preclusion." Id.
59 Cromwell v. Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876) (illustrating the differences between claim
preclusion and issue preclusion). Federal courts recognize that collateral estoppel is
applicable to all cases they hear. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980). See generally
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) ("Application of both doctrines is central to
the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of
disputes within their jurisdiction."). The acknowledgment of collateral estoppel in federal
decisions considering issues decided by state courts promotes comity between state and
federal courts. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971). Furthermore, the Full Faith
and Credit Clause states that the state court decisions shall have full faith and credit in
every court "within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by
law or usage in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000); Allen, 449 U.S. at 95.
60 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4463. The general rule of mutuality stated that "the
favorable preclusion effects of a judgment were available only to a person who would have
been bound by any unfavorable preclusion effects." 18 id. at 677. Triplett v. Lowell
established the need for mutuality of parties before a judgment would be determinative in
a second action. 297 U.S. 638, 642 (1936). This rule stated that common law principles did
not preclude relitigation of a claim against a different defendant. Id.at 644. This rule was
supported by Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912), and the
RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 8, § 93. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found.,
402 U.S. 313, 320-21 (1971). The Triplett court held that, unless mutuality is present,
"neither party (nor his privy) in the second action may use the prior judgment as
determinative of an issue in the second action." Id. (citing Triplett, 297 U.S. at 644).
61

402 U.S. 313.

62 Id. at 314-27. The Court rejected the idea that neither party could use a prior judgment
as an estoppel against another party unless both parties were bound by the judgment since
it would be unfair to allow a party to use a prior judgment when he would not have been
bound to a decision against his interest. Id.
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increases fairness and orderliness in the court system.63 The Court
reasoned that the goal of estoppel is to avoid relitigation of claims while
maintaining fairness to the parties. 64 While the judicial system is
concerned with the accurate resolution of cases, both fairly and
expeditiously, these goals are not best accomplished through a mutuality
requirement of issue preclusion. 65 Therefore, a person who was not a
party to a previous litigation can estop a party from raising an issue
decided in a previous case where the traditional elements of issue
66
preclusion have been established.
In Parklane Hosiery v. Shore,67 the plaintiff used offensive collateral
estoppel to estop a defendant from relitigating issues the defendant had
previously litigated with another plaintiff and lost. 68 The Court
recognized the difference between offensive and defensive use of issue
preclusion and held that courts are given broad discretion in deciding
whether to allow offensive collateral estoppel.69 The Court promulgated
the general rule that, when a plaintiff could have been easily joined or
when application of offensive collateral estoppel would be unfair to a
defendant, issue preclusion should not be applied. 70 While the Supreme

6
Id. at 325. If lack of mutuality exists, then the plaintiff would not be permitted to take
advantage of an earlier finding. Id. A finding to the plaintiff's benefit in the first suit
would not be binding against the defendant in a second suit because the defendant had no
opportunity to contest the issue. Id. The finding against the plaintiff, on the other hand,
would have been made after a full opportunity for the plaintiff to prove the matter that he
urges the second time. Id. Under this rule, no unfairness results from nonmutual collateral
estoppel. Id.
6
Id. at 328. The Court found that it was no longer tenable to allow a litigant more than
one opportunity to have a full and fair litigation of an issue. Id. If a defendant, who has
already presented a complete defense to a claim in a prior suit, is forced to litigate the same
issue against a different plaintiff, judicial resources are wasted and the possibility of
inconsistencies exists. Id. at 329.
6
Id. (citing Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952)).
6
See generally 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4463 (stating that nonmutual issue
preclusion is now permitted in federal courts and in most state courts).
67 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
6
Id. at 329. Contra Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 313 (involving defensive collateral
estoppel where a plaintiff was estopped from asserting a claim that the plaintiff had
previously asserted against a different defendant).
69 Parklane,439 U.S. at 329.
70 Id. at 330. There are two policy reasons for treating defensive and offensive collateral
estoppel differently. Id. at 329-32. First, the two uses of collateral estoppel create different
results in terms of reserving judicial resources. Id. at 329. Defensive collateral estoppel
precludes a plaintiff from relitigating the same issue by simply switching adversaries. Id.
For a plaintiff who is aware of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a strong incentive exists
to join all potential defendants and reserve judicial resources. Id. at 329-30. Offensive
collateral estoppel creates the opposite incentive since a plaintiff could rely on a prior
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Court has decided how federal courts should address the problems of
mutuality in collateral estoppel, it has not yet decided whether collateral
estoppel applies to multiple independent grounds for a decision.
D. The Restatement Reevaluates Its Position
The Restatement of Judgments reviewed collateral estoppel both in
the first and second editions. 71 The American Law Institute ("ALI")
completely reversed its position on the proper procedure for multiple
independent holdings and collateral estoppel between the 1942 edition
and the 1982 edition.72 According to the Restatement of Judgments
section 68, comment n, when a judgment is based on alternative
grounds, the "judgment is determinative on both grounds." 73 The
Second Restatement, however, mandates that, when there are multiple
independent holdings in the first decision, the judgment is not
74
conclusive to either issue alone.
The Second Restatement compares a judgment on multiple
independent grounds to that of a nonessential determination. 75 One of
the main reasons for this shift was that in 1977, when the Tentative Draft
Number Four of the Second Restatement of Judgments was published,
Halpern v. Schwartz76 was the most recent decision on the question of
issue preclusion and multiple independent grounds for a decision.77 The

decision, but the defendant would not be bound by the judgment if the defendant wins. Id.
at 330. This gives the plaintiff an incentive to take a "wait and see" attitude, thereby
wasting judicial resources. Id. Secondly, offensive collateral estoppel may be unfair to a
defendant who does not have an incentive to defend vigorously in a previous case and
then is bound by the judgment in a second case. Id.
71
RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 8; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8. The
Restatement is composed by the American Law Institute ("ALI").
72
Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 8, § 68 cmt. n, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 8, § 20 cmt. e.
73
RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 8, § 68 cmt. n. The Restatement illustrates that, if a
defendant defends on two theories, each of which is determined and "found in favor of the
defendant, a judgment for the defendant is not based on one of the issues more than on the other."
Id. (emphasis added).
74
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. i.
75 Id. "If a judgment of a court of first instance is based on determinations of two issues,
either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support. the result, the
judgment is not conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone." Id.
76
426 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1970).
77 Lucas, supra note 25, at 707. The ALI was persuaded by the reasoning of the Second
Circuit. Id. The ALl analogized the scenario of multiple independent grounds for a
decision with those of a nonessential determination.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tentative Draft No. 4,1977); see also Lucas, supra note 25, at 707.
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rationale behind the Second Restatement's position is that
determinations in the alternative may not have been as carefully
The second
considered as a judgment based on one holding.78
justification deals with the issue of appeal. 79 The losing party, who is
entitled to take an appeal from both determinations, might be dissuaded
from appealing because there is a likelihood that at least one of the
determinations would be upheld, although the other determination
would not even be analyzed by the appellate court. 80 The Second
Restatement emphasizes that, "in the interest of predictability and
simplicity," the result of nonpreclusion should be uniform. 81
E. Halpern v. Schwartz: The Decision that Changed Everything
Traditionally, a decision resting on two independent grounds was
precluded from relitigation on any one of the independent grounds for
that decision. 82 In 1970, the Second Circuit held in Halpern that, when a
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. i. The issue may not have been as
rigorously considered because it may not have been necessary to the result and, therefore,
has many of the same qualities as dicta. Id. The Restatement offers an illustration to more
completely explain this rationale:
3. A brings an action against B for breach of contract and after trial
without a jury, the court holds for B on the basis that (a) the contract is
unenforceable because not in writing and (b) in any event B was
induced to enter the agreement by A's fraud. A is barred from
bringing a secion action on the same claim.
4. The facts are the same as in Illustration 3, but the trial court also
holds that the action is premature because the time for B's performance
has not yet arrived. A is not barred from bringing suit on the claim
after that time has arrived.
Id. § 20 cmt. e, illus. 3, 4.
79 Id. § 27 cmt. i.
80 Id. See infra Part IV.B for an explanation of how a litigant's incentive to appeal is
affected by issue preclusion.
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27. The Restatement offers two illustrations
under comment i. Id. § 27 cmt. i. The first illustration involves A bringing an action against
B to recover interest on a promissory note, but the principal is not yet due. Id. B alleged
fraudulent inducement and that A gave him a binding release of interest obligations. Id.
The court found that B was induced by A's fraud and that A gave him a binding relation of
obligation to pay interest. Id. Under the Second Restatement's view, if B does not appeal
and A brings an action for the principal, when the note matures, if B brings up the defense
of fraud, it must be relitigated. Id. The second illustration assumes the same facts;
however, if A sues for another installment of interest before the principal is due, B is not
liable for the interest because the determination of fraud from the previous case is
conclusive. Id. The distinguishing factor is that, in the first action, the court determined
liability of the interest due and fraud relevant to the recovery of the principal. Id.
82 Lucas, supra note 25, at 703; see City of Covington v. First Nat'l Bank, 198 U.S. 100
(1905); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1154 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Westgate-California
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judgment is supported by multiple independent grounds, none of the
independent grounds would be precluded from future litigation on the
basis of issue preclusion. 83 The trial court found for the Halperns on
three grounds: (1) a removal of property with the intent to hinder or
delay creditors, (2) a fraudulent transfer of property, and (3) a
preferential property transfer. 84 The court noted the concern that the
prior court may not have given rigorous consideration to the alternative
ground and that the losing litigant would not have an incentive to
appeal. 85 The Second Circuit held that the first judgment did not estop
Mrs. Halpern's discharge claim because the previous findings were not
necessary to the judgment. 86 The court also noted that, at that time, in
addition to the Restatement of Judgments, Moore's Federal Practice,and a
Harvard Law Review article, there were only three cases contrary to its

Corp., 642 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 1981); Winters v. Lavine, 473 F.2d 46, 66-67 (2d Cir.
1978); Irving Nat'l Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1926).
83 426 F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1970). The first proceeding in Halpern involved involuntary
bankruptcies against Evelyn and Joseph Halpern ("Halperns") by Chase Manhattan Bank
("Chase"). Id. at 103. Chase charged the Halperns with acts of bankruptcy under sections
3a(1) and 3a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. Section 3a(1) did not require proof of intent to
defraud, while section 3a(2) required proof of intent to defraud. Id.; see also Lucas, supra
note 25, at 704 n.22. The trial court found that an act of bankruptcy took place on three
statutory grounds: first, it was a removal of property with the intent to hinder or delay
creditors under section 3a(1); second, it was a transfer of property under section 3a(1),
fraudulent as to creditors; and third, it was a preferential transfer of property under section
3a(2). Halpern, 426 F.2d at 103. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. Four years later, Mrs.
Halpern filed for a discharge. Id. at 103-04. The district court granted Chase's motion for
summary judgment, and Mrs. Halpern appealed. Id. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the first judgment did not estop her from denying intent in the discharge
proceeding because that previous finding was not necessary to the judgment. Id. at 104.
84 Halpern, 426 F.2d at 103.
85 Id. at 105-06. The court reasoned that, if the previous court was sure as to one of the
independent holdings, then the lower court may not have felt "constrained to give rigorous
consideration to the alternative grounds." Id. at 105; see also Note, Developments in the Law
Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 845 (1952) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (stating
that there is a danger that, if the trier of fact recognizes that the verdict can rest on one of
multiple findings, adequate thought will not be given to alternative holdings). The court
felt that vigorous review of an error as to one ground would not occur since more than one
ground capable of supporting the judgment existed. Halpern, 426 F.2d at 105-06. Therefore,
the losing litigant would have little motivation to appeal; even if the claim of error was
sustained, the decision would still be affirmed on the other independent ground for the
previous holding. Id. The court did mention the particularity in bankruptcy decisions,
stating that debtors are particularly "often handicapped in financing litigation in the
predischarge stages of the proceeding." Id. at 106. A rule of this nature could ultimately
encourage more, rather than less, litigation because parties would take cautionary appeals
in fear of their possible effect on "future indeterminate collateral litigation" -litigation that
neither party is certain will even occur. Id.
8
Halpern, 426 F.2d at 104.
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decision on issue preclusion. 87 The court distinguished these sources
through two criticisms: (1) the seemingly contrary sources did not justify
the opinion each asserted, and (2) these contrary authorities stated that a
judgment based on alternative grounds either "precludes necessary
issues decided in each or precludes no issues necessary to only one
ground," a statement that the Second Circuit regarded as selfcontradictory. 88 While Halpern established one avenue to reconcile the
problem of issue preclusion when applied to multiple independent
holdings, the federal courts have not all adopted the same
methodology. 89
III. NECESSARY TO THE DECISION OR NOT: CONFLICTING APPELLATE
APPLICATIONS OF ISSUE PRECLUSION TO MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT HOLDINGS
Halpern v. Schwartz is one of the leading cases in the federal circuit
split regarding the preclusive effect of multiple independent holdings.
This Part explains the three main views in the federal circuits, which
have created a split in authority. The first view posits that, because each
of the holdings could have stood on its own, each of the holdings is
"necessary" to the judgment, and each should be precluded in future

Id. at 107. The three cases were Florida Central Railroad Co. v. Schutte, 103 U.S. (13 Otto)
118 (1881), Irving National Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1926), and First National Bank v.
City of Covington, 129 F.2d 792 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1903). Id. The Second Circuit distinguished
Schutte by stating that the Supreme Court did not give the state court judgment the
conclusive effect of collateral estoppel but afforded the decision "customary respect" since
the determination was based on the state's highest court as an interpretation of state law.
Id. at 107 n.4. The Halpern court distinguished Irving by stating that the prior judgment was
decided on one legal theory requiring the decision of several facts, and the defendant in the
second litigation tried to challenge the conclusiveness of the facts by arguing that the
judgment could have been raised on a different legal theory. Id. at 107. Irving was subject
to a meaningful appeal because the holding must have received diligent consideration
because "the finding as to that fact was essential to the only legal theory actually utilized in
the prior judgment." Id. Finally, the court distinguished First National Bank on the basis
that the court of appeals affirmed it on the grounds of a valid contract and did not reach
the alternative question of taxes raised in the district court. Id. Since the appellate court
based its decision on a single ground, its judgment was conclusive as to the facts necessary
to that ground. Id.
8
Id. at 107-08; RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 8, § 68 cmt. n; 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE
0.443[5], at 3921-23 (1961); Austin Wakerman Scott, Collateral Estoppel by
Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1942). To support its contentions, the Second Circuit
also cited Developments in the Law, supranote 85, at 845. Halpern, 426 F.2d at 107-08.
89
See infra Part III.
87
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litigation. 90 Second, some of the courts follow the Second Restatement
view that, since there are multiple independent determinations
supporting the holding, each cannot be "necessary" to the judgment, and
these holdings are not precluded in future litigation. 91 Finally, the Sixth
Circuit follows the view that the primary issue in the prior litigation
92
should be precluded but that the secondary issue should not.
A.

An Issue Is Necessary to the Outcome of the Prior Proceeding If It Was
One of Multiple Independent Groundsfor a Decision

1.

In re Westgate-CaliforniaCorp.

In In re Westgate-CaliforniaCorp., 93 the Ninth Circuit held that, when
the prior court rests its judgment on two or more independent grounds,
each determination is necessary to support the judgment. 94 WestgateCalifornia Corporation's ("Westgate") receiver brought an action against
Smith, a Westgate employee, for furniture and a penthouse occupied by
her. 95 The magistrate found that Smith had engaged in conversion,
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and falsification of records and that all
the property in question belonged to Westgate. 96 In the second suit,
Westgate filed a motion for summary judgment in bankruptcy court to
place all of Smith's claims in a lower class, apart from those claimants
who did not participate in the Westgate fraud, and Smith appealed that

90 See infra Part IIA, C, D. The Second and Seventh Circuits are explained under
separate headings to illustrate the uncertainty in the Seventh Circuit and the limited
application of the Halpern decision in the Second Circuit. See infra Part III.C, D.
91 See infra Part 1II.B, D.
92 See infra Part III.E.
93 642 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1981).
94 Id. at 1176. When the "court rests its judgment alternatively upon two or more
grounds, the judgment concludes each adjudicated issue that is necessary to support any of
the grounds upon which the judgment is based." Id. (citing 1B MOORE, supra note 88,
0.443[51).
95 Id. Two actions, commenced by Westgate-California Corporation ("Westgate")
regarding the ownership of furniture and an unlawful detainer to recover possession of the
penthouse where Smith lived, were consolidated and heard before a U.S. magistrate. Id.
Smith acted as the interior decorator for Westgate, which was controlled at the time by her
husband. Id. at 1175. She lived in the penthouse of the Westgate Plaza Hotel without
paying rent or signing a rental agreement until her husband lost control of Westgate, and
then they signed a lease. Id.
96 Id. at 1176. The court ordered Smith to pay the value of the furniture, pay the rent due
under the lease, and vacate the apartment. Id. Smith appealed the summary judgment
order entered in the Chapter X reorganization of Westgate. Id. at 1175. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed those findings, which also had been adopted by the district court. Id. at 1176.
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fraud was a genuine issue of material fact as to her claim. 97 Smith
argued that, since the magistrate's findings were based on alternative
grounds, collateral estoppel did not preclude her from defending the
98
issue of fraud in the bankruptcy proceeding.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit adopted the definition of collateral
estoppel provided by Moore's Federal Practice.99 No contention existed as
to whether the parties were the same or in privity with those of the first
litigation. 100 The Ninth Circuit decided that the magistrate's decision
depended on a determination of whether Smith acted inequitably
regarding ownership of furniture on Westgate property and the
unlawful detainer of the penthouse. 101 The court of appeals found that
the magistrate judge must have determined the issue of fraud in ruling
on the validity of the lease. 102 The court reasoned that Smith's argument
seeking relitigation of the fraud issue was contrary to the established
rule that, when a judgment is based, alternatively on two or more
grounds, each ground is necessary to the judgment. 1°3

Id. The trustees of Westgate filed a motion for summary judgment in the bankruptcy
court to place Smith's claims into a lower priority class, for claims of "'insiders and other
parties who participated in the Westgate fraud,"' which was granted by the bankruptcy
court on the claim for furniture. Id. The bankruptcy judge initially ordered subordination
of all of the appellant's claims. Id. The district court, on appeal, ordered subordination of
all claims. Id.
98
Id. at 1176-77. The Ninth Circuit did not explicitly state the two alternative grounds
on which the magistrate based his determination that Smith was unlawfully possessing the
penthouse.
9
Id. at 1176; see also 1B MOORE, supranote 88, 0.441[2].
Where there is a second action between parties, or their privies, who
are bound by a judgment rendered in a prior suit, but the second
action involves a different claim, cause, and demand, the judgment in
the first suit operates as a collateral estoppel as to, but only as to, those
matters or points which were in issue or controverted and upon the
determination of which the initial judgment necessarily depended.
1B MOORE, supra note 88, 1 0.441(2). See supra text accompanying notes 24-26 for an
explanation of the elements of issue preclusion.
100 Westgate, 642 F.2d at 1176. Smith was the party being precluded from relitigating the
issue of fraud, and the first action had been between California Little America Corporation,
Westgate's receiver, and Smith. Id.
101 Id. at 1175-76.
10 Id. at 1176. To resolve the unlawful detainer proceeding regarding the penthouse, the
magistrate had to determine whether Smith's lease was valid. Id. Therefore, fraud in
procuring the lease was material to a determination of whether the penthouse was
obtained lawfully and whether an unlawful detention proceeding would succeed. Id.
97

103

Id.
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2. Yamaha Corp. of America v. United States
Like the Ninth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, in Yamaha Corp. of America v.
United States,1 °4 held that a judgment based alternatively on two
independent determinations is an effective adjudication as to both
l0 5
grounds, and, therefore, both issues were precluded from relitigation
In the first suit, Yamaha Corporation of America ("Yamaha") sued ABC
International Traders Corporation ("ABC") for trademark infringement
and unfair competition under the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 526.106 The
district court held: first, that Yamaha could not sue under § 526 because
protection was not available to American subsidiaries of foreign
corporations under the U.S. Customs Regulation of those actions and,
10 7
second, that § 526 itself excludes Yamaha's claim.
Yamaha then filed a subsequent suit against the United States of
America, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Commissioner of
Customs (collectively the "U.S.") seeking two declaratory judgments
based on the Tariff Act. 10 8 The district court found for the U.S., holding

104 961 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
105 Id. at 255 (citing MOORE, LUCAS, & CURRIER's MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.441[2], at
729 (1988) [hereinafter CURRIER]).
Id. at 248.
107 Id. at 249-50. This case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
106

Id. at 251. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment determination for ABC International
Traders Corporation ("ABC") by stating that the district court "correctly granted summary
judgment in favor of ABC on Yamaha's claims under the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 526, ....
[and] [wie affirm the district court's determination that the regulation leaves no room for
Yamaha's Tariff Act claim." Id. The D.C. Circuit interpreted this to mean that Yamaha's
claim of independent rights under § 526 was "necessarily rejected by the Ninth Circuit." Id.
at 256.
108 Id. at 251-52. Yamaha's complaint requested that Customs should issue an exclusion
order prohibiting importation of goods manufactured by Yamaha-Japan and, second, that
Yamaha was entitled to a declaratory judgment stating that Customs regulation 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21(c)(2), was invalid. Id. Yamaha offered five reasons for invalidating 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21(c)(2):
1)
it exceeds the authority granted to the Secretary, for he has power
to promulgate only those regulations consistent with law;
2)
it discriminates against Yamaha-America by denying it rights
under the Lanham Act and the Tariff Act to which other domestic
corporations are entitled, merely on the basis of its Japanese
ownership;
it deprives Yamaha-America of its constitutional rights to due
3)
process and equal protection by denying it the protections of the Tariff
Act and the Lanham Act;
it directly conflicts with Article 2 of the Paris Convention for the
4)
Protection of Industrial Property which provides that all members will
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that Yamaha was precluded from relitigating these issues because the
district court determined them in Yamaha's prior case against ABC.1°9
The D.C. Circuit fully examined the doctrine of issue preclusion and
the precedent available from both the Supreme Court and its own
courts.11 0 The court reasoned that preclusion should not "work a basic
unfairness" to the party bound by the first decision."' Since the dispute
in this case fell under the "actually decided" and "necessary to the
judgment" prongs of the issue preclusion analysis, the court analyzed
the preclusive effect almost entirely through previous decisions from the
D.C. Circuit. 112 The D.C. Circuit decided that if a decision was based on

accord to other member owners of trademarks the same rights as
enjoyed by domestic citizens;
5)
it directly conflicts with Article X of the 1953 Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan,
which provides for national treatment of corporations owned by the
other party.
Id. at 252.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 254. The court cited Kremer v. Chemical ConstructionCorp., 465 U.S. 461, 467 n.6
(1982), to justify the application of issue preclusion. Id. (stating "it fulfills 'the purpose for
which civil courts had been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their
jurisdiction'"). Id. The court also used Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980), for the
proposition that "once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment,
that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action
involving a party to the first case." Id. The standards for determining preclusive effect of a
prior holding are cited from a previous D.C. Circuit case, McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d
1197, 1201 (1986). Id. "First, the same issue 'must have been actually litigated, that is,
contested by the parties and submitted for determination by the court."' McLaughlin, 803
F.2d at 1201 (citing Otherson v. Dep't. of Justice, 711 F.2d 267, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
"Second, the issue must have been actually and necessarily determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction." Id. at 1201-02 (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153
(1979)). The court concluded the analysis by citing the Second Restatement, section 37:
"When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties." Yamaha, 961 F.2d at 254.
ill Yamaha, 961 F.2d at 254. The court cites ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330
(1979), and Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,402 U.S. 313,
333 (1971), as well as Otherson, 711 F.2d at 273 to explain the injustice exception. Id. at 254.
The court mentioned that, if the losing party clearly lacked the incentive to litigate the
point in the first trial, but the stakes were much higher in the second trial, it would be
unfair to preclude the losing party from relitigating the issue. Id. See supra Part II.C for an
explanation of the Court's decisions in Parklaneand Blonder-Tongue.
112
Yamaha, 961 F.2d at 254-55; see Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 397 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (explaining that the prior judgment matters, not the court's opinion, and that,
even in the absence of an opinion, a judgment bars the relitigation of an issue necessary to
the judgment). Once an issue is raised and determined, the entire issue is precluded and
not just the argument in support of it. Yamaha, 961 F.2d at 254-55 (citing Sec. Indus. Ass'n

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2003], Art. 11

900

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.37

multiple independent grounds, each of the grounds was precluded from
relitigation. 113 The court found that the issue and the multiple grounds
supporting that decision were already decided and necessary to a
previous judgment and, therefore, could not be relitigated in the case at
14
bar.1
B. An Issue Cannot Be Necessary to the Outcome If It Is One of Multiple
Independent Groundsfor a Decision
The view adopted by the Ninth and D.C. Circuits is among the first
of three differing views. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits take the opposite
view, holding that when multiple independent holdings are evaluated
under issue preclusion, none of the determinations are precluded." 5
1.

Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College

The Fourth Circuit adopted the Second Restatement view in Ritter v.
Mount St. Mary's College. 1 6 The court in the first suit, a Title VII action,
determined that Popenfus, the person to whom Ritter was comparing
her salary, was "clearly more qualified" for tenure than Ritter and that

v. Bd. of Governors, 900 F.2d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The court also cited the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). Id. at 254. Yamaha argued that the
district court did not decide the validity of § 526. Id. The D.C. Circuit found that the first
district court based its conclusion that Yamaha had no enforceable rights under § 526 on
two independent grounds: (1) the government's interpretation of the regulation that was
reasonable under the Supreme Court's review and (2) the text of the regulation itself. Id. at
253.
113
Yamaha, 961 F.2d at 253. The court held that the issue was whether or not Yamaha had
any rights under § 526, "inside or outside of the Regulation," that were violated by the
importation of genuine Yamaha goods. Id. The court determined that this was identical to
the issue now being challenged by Yamaha. Id. Yamaha, defeated by the court's
interpretation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and multiple independent holdings,
then argued that the Ninth Circuit opinion relied exclusively on § 526. Id. The widely
accepted view is that, "when an appellate court affirms on only one of several grounds that
served as alternative bases for the lower court decision, collateral estoppel attaches only to
the issue expressly considered by the appellate court." Id. (citing CURRIER, supra note 105,
[ 0.443 [5-2], at 790 n.2); see Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Martin v. Henley, 452 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1971). However, the D.C. Circuit found that the
Ninth Circuit had to implicitly reject Yamaha's argument that it had private rights under
§ 526 to reach its conclusion. Yamaha, 961 F.2d at 255. See supra note 107 for the Ninth
Circuit's statement.
114
Yamaha, 961 F.2d at 257.
115 See infra Part III.B.1, 2 for an explanation of the Fourth and Tenth Circuit holdings.
116
814 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1987).
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Ritter was not qualified for tenure. 117 In Ritter, collateral estoppel was
raised in the context of an Equal Pay Act ("EPA") claim and an Age
8
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claim."
The Fourth Circuit held that the determinations made in Ritter's Title
VII trial precluded Ritter from litigating her ADEA and EPA claims. 9 9
The court reasoned that to reject collateral estoppel because the trial
court only specifically mentioned one element of the Title VII claim
would "constitute an abandonment of serious judicial reasoning and
decision-making in exchange for the wooden application of judge-made
rules designed to protect litigants." 120 The policy behind collateral
estoppel is to ensure that dicta does not estop later litigation since a
litigant could essentially be denied an opportunity to present his case to

Id. at 993. The second suit was an Equal Pay Act ("EPA") claim and an Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claim. Id. at 989. The second district court
found that the Title VII holding precluded Ritter from establishing an ADEA claim because
the issues needed to be proven were identical-whether Ritter was qualified for tenure. Id.
at 990.
11
Id. at 993. The EPA provides, in part:
(d) Prohibition of sex discrimination
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of
this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in
such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions, except where such
payment is made pursuant to ... (iv) a differential based on any other
117

factor other than sex ....

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). In an EPA claim, once a plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case of an EPA violation, the burden then shifts to the employer to prove that
the pay differential is justified by one of the express exemptions listed in the statute, a
reason other than gender. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 993. Previous cases mention that justifications
for pay differentials include job status, salary, and any "factor other than sex." Id.
119
Ritter, 814 F.2d at 992. Under Ritter's ADEA claim, she would have had to prove: (1)
she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for tenure; (3) despite her
qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) after her rejection the position remained open and
the school continued to seek or accept applications. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). In Ritter's
Title VII claim, the court found that she was not qualified for tenure. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 992.
This finding estopped Ritter from establishing a prima facie ADEA claim because she could
not satisfy the second requirement; the first court had already determined that she was not
qualified for tenure. Id. Summary judgment was properly entered against Ritter on the
EPA claim because the Title VII court's finding that Ritter was less qualified than Popenfus
and that Popenfus was more qualified than Ritter was a sufficient factor, other than sex, for
pay discrepancy. Id. at 993-94.
120

Ritter, 814 F.2d at 994.
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the factfinder. 121 The common concerns with precluding corollary issues,
such as protecting a litigant's right to a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his claims, were not concerns in this case since Ritter had
122
entertained the issue of qualification for tenure in the first suit.
2.

Turney v. O'Toole: The Tenth Circuit Dismisses Issue Preclusion with
a Footnote

In Turney v. O'Toole,123 the Tenth Circuit included a footnote
analyzing issue preclusion and multiple independent holdings. 124
Turney argued that a writ of habeas corpus estopped defendants from
alleging that Turney's confinement was unlawful. 1 25 The petition for the
writ of habeas corpus gave two reasons to support the holding that
Turney's confinement was unlawful: first, that the oral detention order
126
was invalid and, second, that he was being held in an improper ward.
The district court concluded that there was no legal cause for holding
him or continuing to hold him, yet the order granting the writ gave no
reason why Turney's confinement was unlawful. 127 The court adopted
the Second Restatement of Judgments section 27, comments e through i,
holding that, since either reason would have been a sufficient ground for
128
granting the writ, both issues were "actually and necessarily decided."

121 Id. at 993-94. The litigant may not have considered the secondary issue, thereby not
giving it full attention and energy. Id. at 994.
12
Id. The district court noted that the Title VII claim consisted entirely of Ritter
attacking the qualifications of Popenfus. Id. Furthermore, it was the same court to grant
summary judgment on the EPA claim that heard the Title VII claim, thereby ensuring that
Ritter was afforded a full hearing before final judgment of her EPA claim. Id.
123 898 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1990). Turney was a seventeen-year old, suicidal juvenile who
was transferred from a private hospital, via oral order of a district court judge, to be placed
in protective custody in Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital ("Central State") where
O'Toole was the superintendent. Id. at 1471-72. When he was not removed from the adult
maximum security unit, Central State's patient advocate secured a writ of habeas corpus,
and Turney was released into the custody of his parents. Id. at 1472.
124

See id. at 1472 n.1.

125

Id.

126

Id.

Id.
Id. The court also mentioned, however, that the writ could not estop defendant's
argument because the issues in the writ were not actually litigated or decided. Id. The
order only stated that there was "no legal cause . .. for such holding and restraint or
continuation thereof." Id.
127

12
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C. The Second Circuit-Halpern,Williams, and Winters
As discussed in Part II, Halpern v. Schwartz influenced not only the
Second Restatement's view on issue preclusion's effect on multiple
129
independent holdings but also fueled changes in the Second Circuit.
The Halpern court held that, when a judgment rests on alternative
grounds, none of the holdings are precluded from relitigation since none
were "necessary to the judgment." 130 Halpern was, however, limited by
32
13
its own language and later by Williams v. Ward 1 and Winters v. Lavine.1
133
In Williams v. Ward, the defendant, Williams, filed two complaints.
The first complaint stemmed from the denial of Williams' parole. 134 The
second complaint was filed in another district court asking for an
injunction against the denial of parole and requesting that the parole
board afford him a new hearing.135 The district court held that the
petition was denied on two grounds: first, Williams failed to exhaust
state remedies and, second, the denial of parole was based on facially
reasonable grounds and not subject to review by a federal court.136 The
Second Circuit found that these were not multiple independent holdings
but rather alternative procedural and substantive grounds for the

See supra Part ILE. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. i
(comparing comment i with the RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 8, § 68 cmt. n). See supra
Part I.D, E for an explanation of the Restatement's changing view and the Halpern decision.
130 Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 106-08 (2d Cir. 1970).
131 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir. 1977).
132 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978).
133 Williams, 556 F.2d at 1153.
129

134

Id.

Id. The claims in Williams arose from three letters in Williams' file, which stated that
he was mentally unstable; Williams worried that these could prejudice him when seeking
parole. Id. at 1145-47. Williams argued that by denying him the right to see the letters and
argue their content, he was being denied his due process rights and the right to be heard.
Id. at 1147-48. The district court for the second complaint treated this petition as a habeas
corpus request since Williams was attempting to obtain a release from confinement. Id. at
1153.
136 Id.; United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925,
926 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[A] denial of parole, based on a facially reasonable ground, is not
subject to review by a federal court."). The court began its analysis by stating that res
judicata did in fact apply to civil rights actions under § 1983. Williams, 556 F.2d at 1153.
Further, the court resolved any doubt that if the second action came to final judgment first,
then it would bar the former underlying claims if the claims were the same. Id. at 1154.
This rule was based on the RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 8, § 43. Id. This rule seems
harsh if the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, was responsible for the slow progress of
the first action; however, this has been resolved as the risk plaintiffs take when choosing to
pursue separate actions instead of amending the first action to encompass both claims. Id.
135
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decision. 37 Quoting the Second Restatement of Judgments section 49,
comment c, the court stated:
where the judgment is based upon two alternative
grounds, one on the merits and the other not on the
merits, there is a decision on both grounds although
either alone would have been sufficient to support the
judgment, and a subsequent action based upon the same
138
cause of action is ordinarily barred.
The Williams' court was not concerned that the issue might not have
been afforded careful deliberation at the district level because the district
court had fully briefed and discussed the substantive issue.139 The
Second Circuit, noting the uncertainty of the rule regarding the
preclusive effect of independent holdings, reversed the judgment on the
merits instead of reversing on the basis of issue preclusion. 140 The
Williams' court explained that Halpern was not contrary to its decision
because Williams was pursuing two actions simultaneously, and he
could have anticipated potential preclusive effects from the earlier
141
judgment but chose not to appeal the second court's determination.
1 42
Therefore, it was equitable to follow the proscribed rule.
Winters v. Lavine limits Halpern by holding that the Second Circuit
only refused to apply issue preclusion to multiple independent holdings
in "certain narrow circumstances." 143 Winters, a Christian Scientist,
requested that the New York Medicaid program pay for the medical
treatment she received from a Christian Science nurse.'" In Winters'

137 Williams, 556 F.2d at 1154. The procedural decision was that, since the defendant did
not exhaust all of the state remedies, the case was not procedurally ripe for the federal
system. Id. at 1153. The substantive decision was that the denial of parole was based on a
facially reasonable ground and was not the appropriate subject matter for the federal
courts. Id. at 1154.
138 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 49 cmt. c).
139
140

Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1154.

141

Id.

142

Id.

143 Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 67 (2d Cir. 1978).
144 Id. at 50. Winters did not receive, nor solicit, traditional medical services due to her
religion. Id. Instead, she sought the services provided by Christian Science practitioners
and nurses. Id. After Winters appealed the denial of services, the case went to the Second
Circuit for a determination of whether Winters' claims were barred by res judicata. See id.
at 49-54. When Winters' request for payment was denied by the New York City
Department of Social Services ("City Department"), she appealed to the New York State
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first attempt to receive payment, the New York Appellate Division
145
First, the Christian Science nurse
denied her request on two grounds.

was not a registered nurse, and, second, Winters did not demonstrate
that she was entitled to payment under a New York social services law
since she did not have an adequate record of her illness or the treatment
she received.

146

The Second Circuit held that Winters' claim had already been
decided by the New York Appellate Division.1 47 The court further
explained that the doctrine of issue preclusion was not affected by a
decision based on alternative grounds. 148 The court found that there was
no indication in this case that either issue was unnecessary. 149 To
distinguish Halpern, the court stated that, in "certain narrow
circumstances," the Second Circuit has refused to apply issue preclusion
to multiple independent holdings; however, even in the Second Circuit,
the rule to preclude multiple independent holdings when the elements of
issue preclusion are met has continued viability in circumstances unlike
150
Halpern.
D. Uncertainty in the Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has addressed the effect of issue preclusion on
multiple independent holdings twice and has held that these
determinations are both necessary to the judgment and unnecessary to

Department of Social Services. Id. at 50. After she did not appear for that hearing, the
judgment of the City Department was confirmed. Id. Then Winters sought review with the
New York State Supreme Court, which was transferred to the Appellate Division, which
affirmed the State Department of Social Service's decision. Id. at 51.
145

Id.

146 Id. From this decision, Winters unsuccessfully appealed to the New York Court of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court because she lacked jurisdiction in both
courts. Id. After making three other requests to the Department of Social Services for
payment under Medicaid, which were denied, Winters brought this appeal to the Second
Circuit. Id. at 51-53.
147
Id. at 61.
148
149
150

Id. at 66.
Id. at 66-67.

Id. at 67. The court justified the decision in Halpern by limiting it to the bankruptcy
realm. Id. Further, the court noted that Halpern suggested not extending its ruling without
careful case-by-case evaluation outside bankruptcy cases. Id. Therefore, Halpern is to be
read as an exception to the long-established rule in the Second Circuit. Id. A decision is
"necessary" when based on alternative grounds for collateral estoppel purposes. Kessler v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 158 F. 744 (2d. Cir. 1907).
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152
the judgment.' 5' In Magnus Electronics, Inc. v. La Republica Argentina,
the basic dispute was between Magnus Electronics, Inc. ("Magnus") and
the Argentine Republic for damages resulting from what Magnus
believed was conversion of its goods.' 53 The district court dismissed
Magnus' complaint on the basis of res judicata and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 5 4 This decision was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit under
55
res judicata principles.

Magnus asserted that it should not be precluded from relitigating the
question of subject matter jurisdiction because the district court gave two
independently sufficient reasons for dismissing the first suit: lack of
personal jurisdiction over Argentina and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 5 6
The court summarized Magnus' argument as the
following: neither lack of personal jurisdiction nor lack of subject matter

See infra text accompanying notes 153-69 for an analysis of the two conflicting
decisions in the Seventh Circuit.
152 830 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1987).
153 Id. at 1397.
154 Id. at 1397, 1400.
155 Id. at 1397. There were three different suits filed by Magnus in the course of this
dispute. Id. at 1398-99. The first suit was between Magnus and Aerolineas Argentinas
("AA") for AA's breach of contract. Id. at 1389. This complaint was dismissed because the
two-year statute of limitations, as established in the Warsaw Convention, had expired. Id.
The second suit was against La Republica Argentina, alleging that Argentina fraudulently
converted the goods for the benefit of the Argentine military. Id. The court dismissed this
suit for lack of personal jurisdiction because Magnus improperly served Argentina under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Id. The court further held that Magnus' complaint
failed to allege subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Id.
After a discussion with the court regarding the dismissal and potential remedies, Magnus
filed the suit cited above against Argentina, again alleging conversion, and more
specifically explaining the basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 1399. The court explained that claim
preclusion applied to a final judgment on the merits and precluded the same parties or
their privies from relitigating the same issue or any other matter that might have been
offered. Id. at 1400. Since Magnus in both cases claimed that Argentina wrongfully
converted its generators and the parties were the same in both suits, res judicata operates
as a bar to the litigation of this suit. Id. The court further noted that res judicata does
extend to issues of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. If the problem is that the court before
which the case was brought is not a court of competent jurisdiction, then the parties, or the
court, may correct that error by bringing the case before a competent tribunal. Id.
However, this is not what Magnus chose to do. Id. Magnus did not file a motion to amend
the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 15(a), to appeal the
judgment, or even to have the judgment reopened under FRCP 59 or 60. Id. at 1402.
Instead, Magnus chose to refile in the same court, with the same theory of damages, and
against the same party. Id. at 1400-01.
156 Id. at 1402. The court's abbreviated rule of issue preclusion barred relitigation of
issues that were actually litigated and determined in the first proceeding and that were also
necessary to the judgment in that action. Id.
151
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jurisdiction was necessary to the judgment since each was independently
1 57
sufficient for the court to reach its decision or to dismiss the claim.
Magnus cited to Halpern to support its claim. 158 The court stated that the
rule from Halpern had been limited by the Second Circuit: "An
alternative ground upon which a decision is based should be regarded as
'necessary' for purposes of determining whether the plaintiff is
precluded by the principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel from
159
relitigating in a subsequent lawsuit any of those alternative grounds."
Thus, the court rejected Magnus' claims on both res judicata and
collateral estoppel grounds. 6°
In Peabody Coal Co. v. Spese,161 the Seventh Circuit held that the
general principle of issue preclusion states that alternative independent
holdings are not conclusive in substantive litigation to either issue
alone.162 Spese's first claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefit Act
was denied since his medical examination did not show that he had
pneumoconiosis.163 Spese filed a second claim on December 18, 1981;
however, this application was denied because a second round of medical

Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. (citing Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 67 (2d Cir. 1978); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d
157

1133, 1154 (2d Cir. 1977)). The court further stated that no circuit had adopted the
unqualified rule as stated by Magnus and, therefore, the Seventh Circuit would not. Id.
160 Id. at 1400-03. The Seventh Circuit held that no circuit has adopted the "unqualified
rule" asserted by Magnus as stated in Halpern. Id. at 1402. The court stated that Magnus
gave the court no reason to not apply the general rule as modified by the Second Circuit
decisions following Halpern. Id. See supra Part III.C for an explanation of the Second
Circuit's limited view on issue preclusion and multiple independent holdings.
161 117 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 1997).
162 Id. at 1008 (citing Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, U.S.
Dep't. of Labor, 86 F.3d 1358, 1363 (4th Cir. 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8,
§ 27 cmt. i). This case involved a coal miner's quest to obtain benefits under the Black Lung
Benefits Act ("Act"). Id. at 1003. When a coal miner seeks benefits under the Act, it is
common for the applicant to file multiple applications in the event that the initial
application is denied. Id.; see also Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000).
Spese retired in February of 1976 from Peabody Coal, and, two months later, he filed his
first claim for black lung benefits. Spese, 117 F.3d at 1003. Spese underwent a battery of
tests as part of the application, including a physical examination, a chest x-ray, and a
pulmonary function examination. Id. His first claim was denied under the Department of
Labor's ("DOL") criteria for evaluating black lung claims. Id.
163 Spese, 117 F.3d at 1003; see also 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945. Pneumocniosis is "any chronic
lung disease ... caused by the inhalation of particles of coal."
RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1491 (2d ed. 1987).

Spese was informed that he

would have sixty days to submit additional evidence or request a hearing and one year to
submit proof of a changed condition, but he did neither. Spese, 117 F.3d at 1003.
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tests showed no signs of pneumoconiosis. 164 The Seventh Circuit held
that issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues between the same parties
when the issues were actually litigated and necessary to the decision of
the earlier tribunal, including administrative agencies. 165 The Seventh
Circuit noted that a claimant who loses on three possible alternate

164 Spese, 117 F.3d at 1003-04. This second claim was filed after the permanent Black Lung
regulations were in effect. Id. at 1003. The DOL evaluated his claim under 20 C.F.R. § 718.
Id. The criteria to receive benefits included proving: (1) that the claimant is a miner, (2)
that he has pneumoconiosis, (3) that his pneumoconiosis arose at least in part out of coal
mine employment, and (4) that he is totally disabled as a result of pneumoconiosis. Id. at
1004. After the second denial, Spese requested a formal hearing before an administrative
law judge ("ALJ"), which was held four years later. Id. Prior to this hearing, a third chest
x-ray revealed pneumoconiosis. Id. Peabody asked that the record be kept open so that the
ALJ could do its own interpretation of the x-ray. Id. The record was kept open, but
Peabody never offered supplemental evidence to refute the 1985 x-ray. Id. The ALJ found
in favor of Spese. Id. Through an interpretation of 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(c), the ALJ
determined that Spese's 1976 claim should be merged into the 1981 claim. Id. This meant
that Spese would receive his benefits beginning at an earlier date and that it would entitle
him to have the whole record reviewed under the more lenient criteria of Part 727, the DOL
criteria, since the first claim was filed prior to 1978. Id. Further, the ALJ concluded that
there was a "material change in conditions" that warranted the consideration of the second
claim. Id. Spese was awarded benefits starting in April 1976 to his death. Id. Peabody
then appealed to the Benefits Review Board ("BRB"), which agreed with the ALJ's
assessment of the material change but disagreed with the conclusion of a merger of the
original claim, and, therefore, remanded the case to the ALJ for reconsideration under the
more stringent criteria. Id. On remand, the ALJ found that Spese was entitled to benefits
even under the new criteria, but the benefits began on December 1, 1981. Id. at 1004-05.
Peabody appealed to the BRB, which affirmed the ALJ's decision, and then appealed to the
Seventh Circuit. Id. at 1005. Mrs. Spese, since Mr. Spese had passed away, cross-appealed
on the merger of the two claims. Id. The Seventh Circuit panel affirmed that award but
found that the 1981 claim should have been merged with the 1976 claim for purposes of
calculating when the benefits began; the court then took a hearing en banc. Id.
165 Id. at 1008; see also Astoria Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Solinino, 501 U.S. 104, 107
(1991) (explaining that preclusion applies to an administrative agency acting in a judicial
capacity to resolve fact issues properly before it). The Seventh Circuit addressed whether
there was a material change, since a lack of merger resulted in a denial of the new claim,
absent a material change in conditions of the applicant. Spese, 117 F.3d at 1007. The Fourth
Circuit, in deciding Lisa Lee Mines, determined three ways to show a "material change in
condition." Id. (citing Lisa Lee Mines, 86 F.3d at 1363). These include: (1) looking to see
whether the newly submitted evidence favorable to the claim has a "reasonable possibility"
of changing the prior result; (2) requiring the miner to show a material change on every
element previously decided against him; or (3) adopting a "one-element" standard where
claimant's new claim could proceed once he demonstrated a change in at least one element
previously adjudicated against him. Id. The court rejected the BRB's approach, which
required the miner to show a material change on every element previously decided against
him in order to succeed on an argument that his health had materially changed, and he was
Id. at 1008. The approach taken by the BRB made
thereby entitled to benefits.
"mincemeat" out of res judicata because it would leave decisions ever changing, and there
would be no finality to the decisions made. Id.
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grounds has no incentive to appeal one or two of the three
1 66
determinations if the remaining holding is enough to reject benefits.
The court held that, if the passage of time led to a material change on one
of the grounds for the first denial, the claimant is not barred from
proceeding on a new claim solely because he has not negated the other
holdings. 167 The court analyzed this reasoning with general principles of
issue preclusion, i.e., since either determination would be independently
sufficient to support a result, neither issue is conclusive in subsequent
168
litigation with respect to either issue standing alone.
Therefore, under Magnus, the Seventh Circuit would allow issue
preclusion
to prevent relitigation of multiple
independent
determinations comprising the holding of a previous case. However,
Spese supports the rule that multiple independent determinations are not
essential to the judgment and, therefore, should not be precluded in a
subsequent suit. 169 The Sixth Circuit propounded yet a third application
of issue preclusion to multiple independent holdings. 170
E.

The Sixth Circuit Shakes Up the Analysis

The Sixth Circuit recently decided National Satellite Sports, Inc. v.
Eliadis, Inc. 1 71 and held that only the primary decision from a prior final
judgment would preclude an issue from relitigation17 2 In its issue

166 Spese, 117 F.3d at 1008.
167
Id.
168 Id.; Comair Rotron, Inc. v. Nippon Densan Corp., 49 F.3d 1535, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(reasoning that multiple independent holdings are not necessary to the judgment.); Baker
Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1475 (8th Cir. 1994); Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co.,
798 F.2d 38, 45 n.6 (2d Cir. 1986). The court gave an example of how issue preclusion
worked under this rule in the Black Lung Act cases:
If the earlier denial listed both a failure to show pneumoconiosis and a
failure to show total disability, the claimant can avoid automatic denial
of his claim on res judicata grounds by showing a material change in
either of those elements. That is the alternate ground situation that
concerned the Fourth Circuit: because it is impossible to say which of
these independently sufficient reasons for a denial was controlling,
neither can be conclusive in future litigation. To win benefits on the
merits, of course, the claimant would need to prove both ....
Spese, 117 F.3d at 1009.
169 Spese, 117 F.3d at 1008.
170 See infra Part III.E.
171 253 F.3d 900 (6th Cir. 2001).

172 Id. at 909-10. The Melody Lane Lounge, owned by Eliadis, Inc., showed a live
broadcast of a boxing match, which National Satellite Sports, Inc. ("NSS") had obtained
exclusive rights to broadcast to commercial establishments in Ohio. Id. at 904. NSS
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preclusion analysis, the court first determined whether the issues in the
case at bar were the same as those in National Satellite Sports, Inc. v.
Lyndstalder, Inc. ("Coach's Corner").173 The Coach's Corner decision had
rested on the holdings that National Satellite Sports ("NSS") failed to
state a claim, first, pursuant to the terms of the contract and, second,
under 47 U.S.C. § 605.174 Time Warner, the only defendant left when
NSS settled with Eliadis, argued that Coach's Corner had dealt with the
question of whether NSS had standing to sue under § 605, the same issue
that was being litigated in the case at bar.175 The Sixth Circuit found in
favor of Time Warner on the first element of issue preclusion, finding
176
that an identity of issues between Coach's Corner and Eliadis existed.

brought suit against Eliadis and Time Warner. Id. NSS alleged that the showing was a
violation of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (2000). Id.
Eliadis promptly settled and NSS and Time Warner filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, which the district court granted on the issue of liability to NSS and entered a
judgment awarding damages, costs, and attorney fees to NSS. Id.
173 Id. at 908 (citing Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Lyndstalder, Inc., No. 5:97 CV 2039 (N.D.
Ohio 1998)). Time Warner claimed that the district court erred in failing to give preclusive
effect to the adverse judgment against NSS in prior litigation between the parties. Id. at
904. The claim that Time Warner referenced for issue preclusion was a case containing
many of the same facts. Id. NSS learned that Lyndstalder d/b/a Coach's Comer had
shown a boxing match that Time Warner received exclusive rights to distribute to
residential customers, and NSS received the license for commercial customers. Id.
174 Id. at 906. The district court held that NSS "failed to state a claim pursuant to the
terms of the contracts [for distribution] at issue in this case as well as 47 U.S.C. § 605," the
Federal Communications Act of 1934. Id. Time Warner argued that this decision in
National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Lyndstalder, Inc., No. 5:97 IV 2309 (N.D. Ohio 1998), ("Coach's
Corner") precluded NSS from relitigating almost the same issue. Id.
175 Id. at 908.

176 Id. at 908-09. The Sixth Circuit's issue preclusion elements include:
(1) the precise issue raised in the present case must have been raised
and actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (2) determination of the
issue must have been necessary to the outcome of the prior
proceeding; (3) the prior proceeding must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is
sought must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
the prior proceeding.
Id. at 908. This analysis included a determination of whether NSS had a proprietary
interest in the communication sent from Time Warner to its pay-per-view customers, which
was the same issue discussed in Coach's Corner. Id. Further, the issue of bifurcation of the
satellite transmission in Coach's Corner was identical to the manner in which the event was
sent to Time Warner and NSS. Id. NSS contended that the difference between the two
cases lied in the means by which the events were distributed to the residential customers,
i.e., pay-per-view versus Home Box Office ("HBO"). Id. Time Warner stated that Coach's
Corner was a case in which two alternative but independent grounds supported the court's
ultimate judgment and that a plaintiff is precluded from relitigating an issue actually
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Next, the court had to determine whether the district court's finding
in Coach's Corner, that NSS lacked standing under § 605, had been
necessary to the judgment. 7 Until Eliadis, the Sixth Circuit had not
determined whether issue preclusion applied to all or none of the
multiple independent grounds for a decision.178 The court decided not to

decided against it in a prior case, even if the decision rests on alternative grounds. Id. at
909; see also Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Magnus Elecs., Inc. v. La Republica Argentina, 830 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1987); In re
Westgate-California Corp., 642 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d
1143, 1154 (2d Cir. 1977). See supra Part llI.A.1-2, C, D for a discussion of Westgate, Yamaha,
Williams, and Magnus. The court noted the opposite view supported by the ALI in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. i. Eliadis, 253 F.3d at 909. See supra notes
74-81 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Second Restatement position. The
court explained that, if a judgment was based on multiple independent determinations,
each sufficient to support the result, the judgment was not conclusive with respect to either
issue alone. Eliadis, 253 F.3d at 909; 18 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL

PRACTICE
132.03[4][b] (3d ed. 1997). The court further noted that four circuits have
adopted this "modern rule": the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth. Eliadis, 253 F.3d at 909.
See supra Part III.B for an explanation of the Fourth and Tenth Circuit analysis. See infra
note 178 for an examination of the Third and Eighth Circuits application of state law to a
diversity case. The court also mentioned support from the Seventh Circuit in Peabody Coal
Co. v. Spese, but recognized that the Spese decision did not mention the contrary view in
Magnus Electronics. Eliadis, 253 F.3d at 909. In an attempt to stop the Sixth Circuit from
applying issue preclusion, NSS argued that barring it from pursuing a claim against Time
Warner would be unfair. Id. NSS also argued that it had no incentive to pursue an appeal
for the standing under § 605 since the court's determination was equally based on the terms
of the contract. Id. at 909-10. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81 for an explanation of
the policy considerations suggesting a rule that bars all the multiple grounds for the
determination from being relitigated when issue preclusion applies. The court further
emphasized this point by mentioning that NSS won the "battle" over § 605 but lost the
"war" in being unable to overcome the contractual prohibition. Id. at 910.
17 Eliadis, 253 F.3d at 909. The district court held that Time Warner failed to establish
NSS's lack of standing under § 605, which was necessary for a grant of summary judgment.
Id.
178 Id. at 910. The court cited Arab African International Bank v. Epstein, stating that this
case represents the Third Circuit's adoption of the Second Restatement rule that when
multiple independent holdings exist, none are necessary to the judgment, and, therefore,
each holding may be relitigated. Id. at 909. However, Epstein is based on state law. Arab
African Int'l Bank v.Epstein, 958 F.2d 532, 535 (3d. Cir. 1992). This case involved a legal
malpractice action. Id. at 533. Arab African International Bank ("Bank") made a loan to
Sencit S/G Development Company ("Sencit"), and Sencit's attorney, Jonathan Epstein,
issued an opinion letter to the Bank ensuring that the mortgage and note were binding and
enforceable agreements. Id. The opinion letter stated: "[Tihe Mortgage and Note ...
constitute binding, and enforceable agreements of the Partnership in accordance with their
terms ....
" Id. When Sencit failed to pay the principal, interest, or real estate taxes, the
Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. Id. at 533. The proceeding district court had held
that the New Jersey Banking Act forbade the Bank from maintaining an action in New
Jersey, and the Bank was not exempt from this rule due to Epstein's letter. Id. The prior
court held that the Bank had not relied on Epstein's opinion and that even if the Bank did
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resolve the issue directly and instead held that one ground for the
decision in Coach's Corner was overtly primary while the other ground
was secondary. 179 The court held that the Coach's Corner decision had
been based primarily on the conclusion that NSS was contractually
barred from pursuing an action against Time Warner under the language
of the license agreements.1 80 The secondary ground, that NSS failed to
state a claim under § 605, had not been necessary to the granting of Time

rely on Epstein's letter, there was no defense under the New Jersey statute controlling the
case. Id. at 533-34. The Bank then brought a legal malpractice action in the previous suit,
which was disposed of on summary judgment in favor of Epstein on the theory that the
defense of reliance on the opinion letter was raised and resolved in the case of the Bank
against Sencit. Id. at 534. Because this case was in federal court based on diversity of
citizenship, the court applied New Jersey law. Id. at 535. New Jersey had adopted section
27, comment i of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which states that, when a court's
determination is based on two issues, either of which could independently be sufficient to
support the judgment, then "the judgment is not conclusive with respect to either issue
standing alone." Id. at 534 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmts. i, o).
Since each of the previous court's holdings could have supported a ruling in favor of
Sencit, issue preclusion did not apply to either holding in this case against Epstein. Id. at
537. The key question was whether the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. o,
applied to the Appellate Division's reference to the prior district court's decision-that, if an
appellate court upholds both independent determinations for a decision as sufficient to the
judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to both determinations. Id. at 536. Since the issue
of the Bank's reliance on Epstein's opinion letter was not dealt with in the appellate court,
the Bank did not obtain an appellate decision on the reliance issue and, therefore, was not
barred from relitigating the issue. Id. at 537. The Sixth Circuit also cited Baker Elec. Co-Op
v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1475-76 (8th Cir. 1994), stating that the Eighth Circuit also followed
the Second Restatement view. Eliadis, 253 F.3d at 909. In Chaske, the Eight Circuit applied
North Dakota law, the Second Restatement view, of issue preclusion and multiple
independent holdings. Chaske, 28 F.3d at 1475. North Dakota adopted comment i to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27. Vanover v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 438 N.W.2d
524, 526 (N.D. 1989). Both the Devils Lake Sioux Indiana Tribe ("Tribe") and the North
Dakota Public Service Commission ("NDPSC") sought to exercise regulatory authority
over electric services to the Fort Totten Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation
("Reservation"). Chaske, 28 F.3d at 1469. In the first suit, the North Dakota Supreme Court
found that the NDPSC had regulatory authority over competing electric utilities for a
service point within the Reservation on two grounds. Id. at 1476. First, the Otter Tail
Power Company ("Otter Tail") lacked standing to raise the rights of the Tribe, and, second,
assuming that Otter Tail had standing, the Tribe had no right to regulate utilities on the
Reservation. Id. Because North Dakota followed the Second Restatement view, issue
preclusion did not preclude litigation of Otter Tail's claims. Id. Since either of the bases
would have been sufficient to support the result, neither was precluded. Id.
179 Eliadis, 253 F.3d at 910.
180

Id. at 909.
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Warner's summary judgment, and, therefore, the court did not preclude
NSS's appeal of Time Warner's claims. 181
IV. EXTREMIST VIEWS VIOLATE THE POLICIES THAT DRIVE ISSUE PRECLUSION

The American system of adjudication is based on unity. 182 Since
cases and decisions do not stand alone, but are parts of a continuum, the
decisions of one court affect the decisions of other courts. 183 The

Id. at 910. The Sixth Circuit stated that NSS had not had the incentive to appeal the
"secondary decision" that NSS failed to state a claim under § 605 because the language of
the contract would still ultimately result in a win for Coach's Corner; therefore, this
secondary issue was not precluded from relitigation. Id. The court also analyzed whether
the decision was final and on the merits. Id. at 910-11. The court in Coach's Corner resolved
the case according to FRCP 56 and made it clear that its judgment was final. Id. at 910. The
district court stated, "[Bloth parties will more than likely have a disagreement over
everything I say, pretty much, and you can take it up to the Sixth Circuit and they can tell
us whether I was right or wrong." Id. Similarly, summary judgment was a final judgment
for purposes of issue preclusion according to Mayer v. Distel Tool & Machine Co., 556 F.2d
789 (6th Cir. 1977). Id. Lastly, the court decided that there was a full and fair opportunity
for litigation on both sides. Id. All four elements of issue preclusion must be met before
the prior opinion will be given preclusive effect; therefore, NSS was not bound to the
decision in Coach's Corner. Id. at 911. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the "necessary to the
outcome" element was not met but that the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" element
was satisfied. Id.
182 VESTAL, supra note 5, at V-3. The federal courts suffered the problem of a lack of
procedural uniformity until 1934 when Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act,
authorizing a single civil procedure system for the federal system. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION 26-27 (1993). "An
unpredictable rule may be little better than no rule at all." Brian Levine, Note, Preclusion
Confusion: A Call for Per Se Rules Preventing the Application of Collateral Estoppel to Findings
Made in NontraditionalLitigation, 1999 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 435, 449 (discussing the attorneyclient privilege and its confusion, which makes the privilege almost less useful than no
privilege at all); see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). The doctrine of
collateral estoppel is unpredictable because the rules are incomplete, ambiguous, and
undermine each other. Eli J. Richardson, Taking Issue with Preclusion: Reinventing Collateral
Estoppel, 65 MISS. L.J. 41, 46 (1995).
183 VESTAL, supra note 5, at V-3. "A court does not face a legal problem as a new, pristine
blackboard 'never writ upon."' Id. Vestal mentions four different facets of the American
legal system that aid in the goal of unity. Id. at V-3 to V-5. First is stare decisis, a commonlaw scheme that forces courts of today to look at decisions of the past to determine how the
law should be applied. Id. at V-3. Second is the "law of the case," which forces a court to
follow the decisions made earlier in the same case regarding the same point. Id. at V-3 to
V-4. Third, the courts are affected by related lawsuits pending concurrently to avoid
resolutions that conflict, as well as duplication of cases and the misuse of the court system.
Id. at V-4. Finally, the Constitution provides safeguards to protect the judicial process from
inconsistent decisions. Id. The Full Faith and Credit Clause forces a state to recognize an
earlier decision by another state court. Id.; U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
181
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question of issue preclusion will almost always be a fact-sensitive
analysis; however, predictability and simplicity are vital to a uniform
federal system. 184 When the federal circuits adopt different views on the
application of issue preclusion, unity is lost, and litigants receive
inconsistent treatment in different circuits, in contravention of the goal of
185
unity.
There are three major views on how to apply issue preclusion to
multiple independent holdings. 186 The first view states that, when a
judgment is based on alternative grounds, the judgment is determinative
on all grounds. 187 The second view is the direct opposite. If a judgment
is based on the determination of two issues, either of which could
independently support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with
respect to either issue standing alone. 188 The third view states that the
court applying issue preclusion should preclude the primary
189
determination but should not preclude any secondary issues.
Issue preclusion is an appealing doctrine because it is predictable
and is easy to apply. 190 In reality, however, courts and scholars have

Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art I, § 1.
184 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. i. The Second Restatement takes
the position that multiple independent holdings are unnecessary to the judgment and,
therefore, are not precluded from relitigation. Id. Comment i acknowledges that the
balance might tip to preclusion if an issue was litigated to a complete extent and decided in
the first action, but the Second Restatement does not allow judicial discretion to make this
decision in the interest of equity. Id.
185
See supra Part I (illustrating through the hypothetical the contradictory outcomes of
Johnson v. Cohen depending on the circuit's view of issue preclusion's effect on multiple
independent holdings).
186
See supra Part III (outlining the three major views in the federal courts).
This is the view taken by the Restatement of Judgments, the Ninth Circuit, the D.C.
187
Circuit, Magnus Electronicsv. La Republica Argentina in the Seventh Circuit, and Winters v.
Lavine and Williams v. Ward in the Second Circuit. See supra notes 73, 93-103, 104-14, 152-60,
133-50 and accompanying text.
18
This view is shared by the Second Restatement of Judgments, the Third and Eighth
Circuits in state law interpretation, the Fourth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, Peabody Coal Co. v.
Spese in the Seventh Circuit, and Halpern v. Schwartz in the Second Circuit. See supra notes
74-81, 123-28, 161-68 and accompanying text; supra note 178 (explaining the decisions of the
Third and Eighth Circuits).
189
Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 910 (6th Cir. 2001); see also supra
Part III.E.
190
Richardson, supra note 182, at 42. Collateral estoppel is one of the most sacred
doctrines in Anglo-American law. Id. at 41. Presumably, if the relatively consistent
elements apply, then issue preclusion applies; however, if the elements are lacking, then
the issues can be relitigated between the parties. Id. at 42.
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created a collateral estoppel jurisprudence that is inconsistent and
difficult to predict. 191 This jurisprudence takes the virtues and goals of
issue preclusion and pits them against conscientious parties who look to
predict and strategize their litigation to best succeed in the short and
long term.
The three major problems with "all or nothing" views and
inconsistent federal rules are that parties' litigation strategies are
hindered, parties' rights to appeal are infringed upon, and inefficiency in
the court results. 192 First, litigation strategy is based on parties knowing
the rules to which they will be held and how to best use them. 193 With a
split that causes uncertainty in the federal courts, litigants will be
challenged in planning their litigation strategy and may be forced to
plead only the strongest arguments in fear of future preclusion. Second,
the right to appeal is affected when litigants are forced to plead certain
arguments due to the procedural guidelines being applied. 194 Third,
both extreme views allow the benefits of collateral estoppel to be crushed
95
by increasing litigation and frustrating judges, juries, and parties.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis,
Inc. held that the "primary" issue would be precluded from relitigation
on the basis of issue preclusion, while the "secondary ground" could be
relitigated. 96 The court assured that it was not deciding whether
multiple independent grounds for a decision automatically prohibited
application of issue preclusion; however, this is the only Sixth Circuit
case to address this issue. 197 The Sixth Circuit has given an alternative to
the black-and-white, preclude or not preclude options, but has not given
198
any guidance to the lower courts for future cases.

191

Id.

192 See infra Part IV.A-C.
193 See infra Part IV.A.

19
195
19
19

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
253 F.3d 900, 910 (6th cir. 2001); see also supra Part III.E.
Eliadis, 253 F.3d at 910; see also supra Part III.E.
198 For example, there is no guidance as to what constitutes a "primary" holding and

what factors a court should consider when contemplating whether a determination was
"primary" or "secondary." Additionally, there is no precedent stating that a secondary
holding is not appealable. Therefore, a holding could be both subject to appeal and subject
to relitigation. This solution is inequitable.
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Litigation Strategy

Parties often plead more than one defense or claim more than one
basis for relief in the event that they are unable to sufficiently prove
either claim. 199 This decision is based on the res judicata doctrine
itself. 200 Parties cannot relitigate a claim if an issue that could have been
raised was not; therefore, they cannot risk leaving out a potential
argument that may win the case. 201 However, depending on whether the
jurisdiction allows application of issue preclusion to multiple
independent holdings, a litigant may have an incentive to leave out a
20 2
defense or a claim for efficiency.
In the hypothetical of Maureen Johnson and Mark Cohen introduced
in Part I, the federal court in which Johnson filed the first case can affect
how vigorously the parties assert each alternative claim in the first
case. 20 3 For example, if Johnson v. Cohen I is in a Restatement jurisdiction,
and Cohen has a strong case that Johnson signed a binding release of
Cohen's obligation to pay the interest on the promissory note, the parties
will save time and money. Cohen will not vigorously argue, nor will
Johnson vigorously defend, the claim that the note was fraudulently
induced. If a future case for the repayment of principal arises, Cohen
2°4
will be forced to relitigate fraudulent inducement of the note.
However, if Johnson v. Cohen I is in a jurisdiction that allows issue
preclusion of multiple independent holdings, then both parties will
vigorously advocate their positions on fraudulent inducement, knowing
they will be bound by the judgment of each determination in future
205
cases.

199 See Lucas, supra note 25, at 702.
200 See supra Part ILA, D for an explanation of the doctrine of res judicata, the differences
between claim and issue preclusion, and the Restatement suggestions.
201 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. i (stating that if a judgment based
on multiple independent holdings was not conclusive as to both issues, a party who would
assert several arguments might be deterred from doing so since the issues would not be
precluded from relitigation). The rule of claim preclusion states that a judgment puts an
end to the cause of action and cannot be brought into litigation between the parties again,
including any other matter that could have been offered for that claim. 18 WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 6, § 4406, at 45; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, §§ 18-20.
202
203
204

RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supranote 8, §§ 18-20.
See supra Part I.
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 8, § 68 cmt. n.

205 See Erichson, supra note 53, at 952.
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The differing views on whether multiple independent holdings can
be precluded in future suits also affect the mutuality rule. 20 6 For
example, A sues B in a patent infringement case, and B wins based on
two grounds: A's patent was invalid and B was licensed to use the
patented item. A then sues C based on the same patent but for a
different claim. 20 7 If A v. C is in a Restatement jurisdiction, then C can
preclude A from arguing that the patent is valid under defensive
nonmutual collateral estoppel. 208 However, A, master of her claim,
would have the ability to chose the forum for A v. C, and it would be in
her best interest to chose a Second Restatement jurisdiction. A could
argue that since the A v. B judgment was based on two independent
reasons for B's win, the issue of patent validity was not necessary to the
decision and A should be able to relitigate patent validity. 2 9 As a result,
the circuit split encourages forum shopping by A because she can sue an
infinite number of defendants for patent infringement. Not only does
this increase litigation, but parties have strategic advantages or
disadvantages depending on the circuit, and the federal courts were
210
created to eliminate this inconsistency.

See supra Part II.C for an explanation of the Supreme Court's treatment of issue
preclusion. The Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue abolished the rule requiring mutuality as
an element of issue preclusion. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313 (1971). The requirement of mutuality was eroded because the ultimate goal of issue
preclusion is "limiting relitigation of issues where that can be achieved without
compromising fairness in particular cases." Id. at 328. Another reason for dismissing the
rule of mutuality is that courts no longer felt that it was tenable to allow a litigant more
than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue. Id. There is a
misallocation of resources when a defendant is forced to present a complete defense to a
claim that the plaintiff has already fully litigated and lost in a previous case. Id. at 329.
These goals, which lead courts to reject the mutuality requirement, are implicated with
multiple independent holdings and the Second Restatement view that multiple
independent holdings are not subject to issue preclusion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 8, § 27 cmt. i. The Second Restatement view increases litigation and allows a
party more than one opportunity to fully litigate an issue.
W7
If the claims were the same, the plaintiff presumably would have had to join the
defendant under compulsory counterclaim rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a) (stating that if a
party's absence will cause incomplete relief, the party must be joined unless an exception
under 19(b) applies).
208 See supra note 73 for the first Restatement view. The first Restatement allowed the
application of issue preclusion to multiple independent holdings. See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST), supra note 8, § 68 cmt. n. The plaintiff should not be allowed to relitigate the
validity of the patent because that determination was necessary to the prior judgment, and
plaintiff was a party. Additionally, the issue was actually litigated and decided.
209 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. i.
210 See supra note 182 and accompanying text (explaining the Rules Enabling Act and the
need for predictable and consistent rules in the federal court system).
206
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Further, certain parties can be the targets of issue preclusion in later
suits. For example, defendant manufacturers of defective products could
lose in a suit against Plaintiff 1. Plaintiff 2 can then sue under the same
issue and invoke nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel to prevent
relitigation of the issue of defect. 211 This use of issue preclusion is
effective for conservation of judicial resources; however, the defendant's
litigation strategy will be significantly affected by issue preclusion's
existence. The defendant may want to settle the first case if victory is not
assured, or the defendant will need to vigorously defend to avoid the
212
effects of issue preclusion.
B.

The Right to Appeal

Litigation strategy is further implicated through the appellate
process. In a jurisdiction where multiple independent holdings are not
precluded in future suits, the losing party does not have an incentive to
appeal because the decision cannot be used against that party in future
litigation. 213 However, in a jurisdiction where multiple independent
holdings can be precluded in subsequent litigation, the losing litigant is
encouraged to take a "cautionary appeal" to ensure that a negative
decision will not be used in future litigation to that party's detriment.
While the right to appeal is not constitutionally based, it is inviolable
in our legal system. 214 The right to appeal is rooted in "process values,"
the idea that the legal community is concerned with ensuring that
litigants feel they were treated fairly. 215 Our society suggests that, at a
minimum, we insist that the appropriate rules of decision are

211 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text for an explanation of nonmutual
collateral estoppel and the Supreme Court's decision holding that its application is
equitable and efficient.
212 Even if the defendant were to win against the first plaintiff, she would still have to
litigate if the second plaintiff brought suit. Since the second plaintiff was not a party to the
first action, the defendant could not use issue preclusion to bar litigation.
213 See supra text accompanying notes 83-88 for Halpern's policy considerations.
214 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) ("An appeal from a judgment of
conviction is not a matter of absolute right, independently [sic] of constitutional or
statutory provisions allowing such appeal."); Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to
Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 66 (1985) ("The right of appeal, while never
held to be within the Due Process guaranty of the United States Constitution, is a
fundamental element of procedural fairness as generally understood in this country.").
215 Dalton, supra note 214, at 66-67 (citing the American Bar Association Committee on
Standards of Judicial Administration Standards Relating to Appellate Courts § 3.10
commentary, at 12 (1977)).
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followed. 216 The goal of uniformity across the federal system paired with
the right to appeal, reveals an injustice when one jurisdiction creates an
incentive to appeal, to ensure that an erroneous decision is not imputed
in future litigation, while another jurisdiction makes that appeal a waste
217
of resources.
Halpern v. Schwartz considered the issue of appeal and stated that a
court may not have given each determination rigorous consideration if
another ground by itself could determine the case. 218 This, however,
seems implausible because judges are acutely aware of collateral
estoppel's effects, as well as the prerequisite of a final determination for
an appeal. Furthermore, vigorous review of one holding would not
occur since the other determination could sustain the judgment. 219 While
Halpern cites this reason as a compelling argument to make alternative
holdings immune from issue preclusion, it appears to be a better reason
to preclude multiple independent holdings so that accurate decisions are
preferred over procedural loopholes. The Halpern philosophy results in
a denigration of the right to appeal.
C. Efficiency
One of the alleged strengths of collateral estoppel is that it decreases
litigation. 220 The Second Restatement/Halpern view sacrifices this asset
by forbidding the application of issue preclusion to multiple
independent holdings.221 Using the Johnson v. Cohen hypothetical, it is
easy to see how a lack of preclusion caused a duplication in litigation,

216 Id. Society also insists that the parties have an adequate opportunity to present their
case and respond to the adversaries and that the tribunals be unbiased and competent. Id.
at 67. How parties feel about the process may be just as important, if not more important,
than the actual award of damages or fault. Id.
217 For example, if A sues B in a Second Restatement jurisdiction (multiple independent
holdings will not be precluded from relitigation) and forces the court to make multiple
independent holdings, but if A loses, A should not appeal. If A appeals and the appellate
court affirms on one of the two determinations, then A will be precluded from relitigating
that matter. If A does not appeal, A could sue another defendant on the same issue and not
be precluded from relitigating since the A v. B decision was based on multiple independent
holdings. This conclusion appears to favor a rule of procedure over accurate judgments.
218 Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1970); Jean F. Rydstrom,
Annotation, Collateral Estoppel Effect, in Federal Court, of Judgment Resting on Independent
Grounds, 29 A.L.R. FED. 764, 766 (1976). See supra Part II.E for an explanation of Halpern v.
Schwartz.
219 Rydstrom, supra note 218, at 766.
220 See supraPart II.B.
221 See supraPart II.D, E.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2003], Art. 11

920

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

222
the precise inefficiency that collateral estoppel seeks to address.
Additionally, in a system where multiple independent holdings are
subject to an absolute rule of no preclusion, a litigious plaintiff would be
encouraged to sue on multiple grounds for the same issue, using
different defendants until successful. 223 For example, A sues B and loses
on two issues. In a Second Restatement jurisdiction, if both issues are
independent to the judgment against A, then A can relitigate both issues
against C in a subsequent suit.224 Additionally, the Second Restatement
rule encourages A to make the case more complicated by alleging
additional issues so that the case will have multiple independent
holdings.

Furthermore, collateral estoppel, as a procedural rule, seeks to create
uniformity in judgments, which in turn encourages faith in our judicial
system. 2 Repeat litigation on already-decided issues creates a greater
potential for inconsistent judgments. For example, if the court in Johnson
v. Cohen II decided that Cohen was not induced by fraud to sign the note,
Cohen would lose on the very issue that the judge in Johnson v. Cohen I
decided in his favor.
Since Halpern v. Schwartz, many scholars have criticized the Second
Restatement's change in position on issue preclusion's effect on multiple
independent holdings. 226 The ALI, author of the Restatements, reached
the new rule by analogizing multiple independent holdings to

In Johnson v. Cohen I, the court determined that Cohen was fraudulently induced to
sign the promissory note and that Johnson had executed a release of Cohen's obligation to
pay interest. Since, in this example, multiple independent holdings are not precluded from
relitigation because they are not necessary to the judgment, Johnson v. Cohen II was fully
litigated on an issue presented in Johnson v. Cohen I. Furthermore, the cited cases in this
Note illustrate the vast litigation over the rules of collateral estoppel, thereby
circumventing the policies that sustain the doctrine.
M
Goblirsch v. W. Land Roller Co., 246 N.W.2d 687, 691-92 (Minn. 1976).
224 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND),supra note 8, § 27 cmt. i.
225 See generally Richardson, supra note 182, at 45-46 (stating that the purpose of issue
preclusion is to "conserve judicial resources, preserve 'the integrity of the court' by
preventing inconsistent resolution of issues, promote 'finality of judgments,' protect
defendants from repetitive litigation, ensure that a winning 'party should not have to fight
anew a battle it has already won,' and promote 'conclusive resolution disputes'").
226 See Lucas, supra note 25; see also Erichson, supra note 53; E. William Stockmeyer, Res
JudicataEffects of Unappealed,Independently Sufficient Alternative Determinations, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 717 (1985). The Second Restatement prescribes an exemption from the doctrine of
issue preclusion when a prior decision is based on multiple independent holdings.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supranote 8, § 27 cmt. i.
222
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The Second Restatement correlates
nonessential holdings.27
nonessential determinations to dicta, which would not be available for
Therefore, the Second Restatement indirectly describes
appeal. 22
determinations as dicta.229 However, there is no
independent
multiple
reason to believe that each determination is dicta solely because more
than one argument could have led to the court's decision. 230 Because
multiple independent holdings are appealable, they are more like
essential determinations. 231 Furthermore, strict nonapplication of issue
preclusion in decisions with multiple independent holdings disregards
the substantive worth of the previous decision. 23 2 Judges, or juries
issuing a special verdict, who are overturned on a successful appeal or
relitigation of decided issues, feel as if their time and energy have been
wasted, the work put forth in the case is unappreciated, and, worst of all,
233
their judgment has been called into question.
The ALI has considered, and implemented, both major views
concerning issue preclusion's effect on alternative holdings in the First
and Second Restatements of Judgment. 2m The Halpern decision raised
two compelling arguments that ultimately caused a reversal of the First
Restatement rule and adoption of the current rule under the Second

227 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmts. e, h. The theory is that, since either

independent determination could have led to the decision, neither determination is
"essential" in the strict sense of the word. Stockmeyer, supra note 226, at 727-28 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. i). This strict analysis is also inconsistent
with other sections of the Restatement. Id. Section 27, comment o, of the Second
Restatement states that collateral estoppel effect will be given to alternative determinations
that are affirmed on appeal. Id. Additionally, section 27, illustration 16, allows preclusion
of multiple independent holdings if, when taken together, they necessarily decide the issue.
Id.
8
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. h.
229 See id.
230 See Lucas, supranote 25, at 702.
231 Stockmeyer, supra note 226, at 727. Multiple independent holdings are more like
essential determinations since they are reviewable on appeal, while dicta or nonessential
determinations are not. Id.
232 See Malloy v. Trombley, 405 N.E.2d 213, 216 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that, while not
enunciating a broad rule, issue preclusion is applicable even though the issue decided was
one of multiple independent decisions by the trial court since all of the elements of issue
preclusion were met); see also Goblirsch v. W. Land Roller Co., 246 N.W.2d 687, 691-92
(Minn. 1976) (reasoning that a mechanical application of a collateral estoppel exception for
alternative determinations unnecessarily ignores that substantive worth of the prior
decision since it would question the jury's full and complete decision).
233 Dalton, supra note 214, at 68.
234 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 8, § 68 cmt. n; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
8, § 27 cmt. i; see also supra Part IID.
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Restatement. 235 However, this change has not rectified the inconsistency,
uncertainty, and equity problems in applying issue preclusion to
independent holdings.
V.

CONTRIBUTION-REVISITING THE RESTATEMENT ONCE MORE

This Note proposes a new rule and comment to the Second
Restatement. The new rule creates a discretionary exception to the
general rule of issue preclusion for decisions based on multiple
independent holdings. The multiple independent holdings exception is
invoked when there is no incentive to appeal the prior decision and the
party arguing against issue preclusion can show that an injustice would
result from the application of issue preclusion. 236 Currently, the Second
Restatement sets out the general rule of issue preclusion in section 27
with a note that provides: "exceptions to this general rule are stated in
section 28." 237 The exceptions in section 28 illustrate situations in which

235 See Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 105-06 (2d. Cir. 1970). Even subsequent Second
Circuit decisions note the unusual quality of the Halpern situation and find its facts to be
the exception and not the rule for issue preclusion on multiple independent judgments. See
supra Part III.C (explaining how Winters v. Lavine and Williams v. Ward shaped the Halpern
decision). Winters states that Halpern is not intended to have extended application, as noted
by the court's limiting Halpern to the facts. Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 67 (2d Cir. 1978).
This narrow reading was confirmed by Winters, which stated that Kessler v. Armstrong Cork
Co., 158 F. 744, 747-48 (2d Cir. 1907), is still good law, holding that a decision based on
alternative grounds is "necessary" for issue preclusion purposes. Winters, 574 F.2d at 67.
Therefore, Winters supports this Note's contribution that the concerns established in
Halpern are an exception and do not alter the rule of issue preclusion and multiple
independent holdings.
236 Stockmeyer suggests that, when Halpern concerns of inadequate reasoning and a lack
of full litigation are present, a party should be allowed to escape issue preclusion for
alternative determinations. Stockmeyer, supra note 226, at 730-31. Stockmeyer suggests
that the Second Restatement allows judicial discretion if a party can show a "clear and
convincing need for a new determination of the issue because of [an] inadequate
opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action." Id. This
interpretation ignores section 27, comment i. Id. Section 27, comment i states that
There may be causes where, despite these [Halpern]
considerations, the balance tips in favor of preclusion because of the
fullness with which the issue was litigated and decided in the first
action. But since the question of preclusion will almost always be a
close one if each case is to rest on its own particular facts, it is in the
interest of predictability and simplicity for the result of nonpreclusion to be
uniform.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 cmt. i (emphasis added). Thus, the discretionary
exceptions of section 28 do not currently apply to multiple independent holdings. See
generally Lucas, supranote 25.
237 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27. This sections states: "When an issue of fact
or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
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the elements of issue preclusion are met, but it would be unfair to
preclude relitigation of the issues.2 38 However, multiple independent
holdings are governed by section 27, comment i, which creates a
nondiscretionary exception, prohibiting issue preclusion application for
multiple independent holdings. 239
As an all-encompassing and rigid rule, the Second Restatement has
many ill effects, such as increased litigation, tainting parties' incentive to
appeal, and encouraging manipulative litigation strategies. 240 Just as the
Second Restatement does not give full attention to the implication of a
nondiscretionary rule, the First Restatement failed in the same manner.
The First Restatement did not consider the problem of a potential lack of
incentive to appeal, nor the possibility that there could have been less
rigorous consideration by the first court.
Instead of the approaches taken by the First and Second
Restatements, this Note proposes that, when any of the injustices feared
by the court in Halpern surface in a second suit as a result of an earlier
decision based on multiple independent determinations, an exception
should be available that can be implemented at the discretion of the

determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent
action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." Id. The rule on
multiple independent holdings and their preclusive effect is found in section 27 under
comment i. Id. at cmt. i.
23
Id. § 28. The exceptions for applying issue preclusion include: (1) when a party could
not appeal the issue attempting to be precluded; (2) when the issue is one of law and the
actions involving the claims are unrelated, or there has been a change in legal climate; (3)
when a new determination is warranted by differing procedures of the two courts; (4)
when a party had a heavier burden of persuasion in the first action and the burden has
shifted in the second action; or (5) when there is the potential for adverse impact on public
interest or it was not foreseeable at the time that the issue would arise again. Id. Welleducated litigants and their attorneys should recognize that, while issue preclusion can be
used as a shield or a sword during litigation, an "injustice exception" can be used by a
party to fight against issue preclusion application. Issue preclusion as a sword means that
the party invoking issue preclusion would use it to satisfy their burden of proof without
allowing the other party to argue against the previous judgment. Issue preclusion as a
shield means that a party would invoke issue preclusion to prevent the other party from
bringing new arguments on a previously litigated issue.
239 Id. § 27 cmt. i.
240 See id. (stating that since each case rests on its own particular facts, in the interest of
predictability and uniformity, nonpreclusion should be uniform through an unbending
rule). The Second Restatement sacrifices equity and conservation of judicial resources for
uniformity. In cases where an issue was fully considered and litigated in the first suit, it
will still be subject to relitigation because issue preclusion does not apply if it was
accompanied by another independent determination. See generally id; see also supra Part IV.
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second judge. 241 Issue preclusion is a doctrine that relies on the
discretion of the judges. 242 The danger of perpetuating erroneous
decisions is a concern of the parties and the court system; therefore, the
243
discretion should be left in the judges' hands.
A.

ProposedAmendments

The following proposed amendments to the Second Restatement of
Judgments should be adopted by each of the federal circuits. First,
section 27: "Issue Preclusion -General Rule" should remain unedited.
Second, section 27, comment i, should be redacted in its entirety. Third,
under section 28, a new exception should be added as follows: 244
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined
by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a
subsequent action between the parties is not precluded
in the following circumstances:

(6) A prior decision is based on multiple independent
holdings, and the party who objects to the application of issue
preclusion can show that (a) one of the multiple independent

See Stockmeyer, supra note 226, at 719 (stating that the Second Restatement "advocates
a nondiscretionary exception" to issue preclusion if a party loses an issue that is
determined by multiple independent holdings). This is also essentially what the Sixth
Circuit has done. See Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Sixth Circuit recognized the danger in precluding a "secondary" issue, or by analogy,
one that was not given rigorous review by the first court. Id.
242 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 28 (listing the exceptions to issue
preclusion, which are dependent on the judge's discretion).
243 Stockmeyer, supra note 226, at 719; see also Moch v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd.,
548 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1977). A revision to the Restatement must take into
consideration the concerns of Halpern, which prompted the change from the First
Restatement to the Second Restatement. Halpern's two basic concerns in precluding
multiple independent holdings were that the first court might not rigorously consider an
issue if it is one of two or more independent reasons for a decision and that a litigant will
not have an incentive to appeal an issue because an appellate court that finds an error in
issue one could still uphold the judgment with respect to issue two. Halpern v. Schwartz,
426 F.2d 102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1970). Additionally, Halpern was concerned with inefficiency
in the appellate court system due to cautionary appeals taken by the losing litigant who
fears that the less strong of the multiple holdings could be used in future litigation. Id.
244 The Note's contribution is in italicized text. The text in regular font is taken from the
existing Restatement (Second) of Judgments.
241
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issues was not given complete analysis by the prior court due
to the multiplicity of issues supporting the holding; or (b) the
party did not exercise its right to appeal because it was not
sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the
litigation that the issue would arise in the context of a
subsequent action. See illustration12.245
Finally, comment j should be added to section 28 as follows:
Commentj.
The First Restatement provided that, when a judgment is
based on alternative independent grounds, both grounds are
material, and issue preclusion applies to both judgments. In
1970, Halpern v. Schwartz, decided by the Second Circuit,
suggested a change in the rule to rectify concerns of
incomplete analysis by the first trial court and to ensure
adequate appellate review. The Second Restatementfollowed
Halpern's reasoningand created an absolute rule prohibiting
issue preclusion in cases of multiple independent holdings. In
light of the criticisms of the Halpern decision, the more
equitable rule is to allow issue preclusion to be applied to
multiple independent holdings with an exception for cases like
Halpern. Judges can utilize their discretion to determine if
the issues were fully considered in thefirst action and whether
there was such a disincentive to appeal that it would be unfair
to bind a party to a multiple independent decision of a prior
holding. The burden of prooffalls on the party seeking to use
the exception to prove that an injustice would occur because of
the multiplicity of the prior holding. Under this new
approach, fairness and equity, through the discretion of
judges, trump a rigid rule.
The new rule encourages a court in the first action to fully consider
the issues brought before it. It also limits litigants to one "bite at the
apple" and will prevent the first court from having its decisions
rendered inconsistent by subsequent courts that view the issue
differently. 246 Furthermore, this rule encourages the parties to appeal

See infra Part V.B for the proposed illustration and resolution of the hypothetical
introduced in Part 1.
246 See supra Part IV.C for an explanation of the efficiency concerns implicated by the
doctrine of issue preclusion and the current First and Second Restatement views.
245
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when it is foreseeable that an issue will become the subject of a
subsequent suit, yet the rule does not create a penalty when a party does
not take a cautionary appeal, nor does it encourage appeals without
247
justification.
B.

Illustration 12 and Resolution of Hypothetical

In addition to the proposed amendment to section 28, the following
illustration should be adopted by the Restatement of Judgments:
Illustration12.
A brings an action against B to recover interest on a
promissory note payable to A, the principal not yet being due.
B succeeds on two independent determinations: B was
induced by fraud to sign the note and A executed a binding
release of B's obligation to pay interest on the note. After the
note matures, A brings an action against B for the principal of
the note. A will be precludedfrom bringing this suit unless A
can prove to the court either that the prior court did
completely analyze the issue offraudulent inducement or that
A did not exercise her right to appeal because it was not
sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the
prior litigation that the issue offraudulent inducement would
be the context of a subsequent litigation.
The illustration provides a practical application of the new exception
to section 28 for both judicial guidance as well as providing assistance to
parties anticipating the issue preclusion application to multiple
independent holdings.
The proposed amendment impacts the hypothetical in Part I. In
Johnson v. Cohen I, the suit for interest on the promissory note signed by
Cohen, the court found for Cohen on two independent alternative
theories: first, the signing of the note was induced by fraud, and, second,
Johnson executed a release of Cohen's obligation to pay the interest.
These determinations are independent because Cohen could prevail in

This reasoning is in line with the Sixth Circuit, which considered that it would be
unfair to allow a "secondary" issue to preclude relitigation in a subsequent suit. Eliadis,
253 F.3d at 910; see also Part IV.B (discussing the implications on the right, and incentive, to
appeal under the current schools of thought on issue preclusion and multiple independent
holdings).
247
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the first suit if: first, the note was fraudulent and therefore not
enforceable, which logically means that the interest due on such a
fraudulently obtained note would not be collected either; or second, the
court found that Johnson executed a release on Cohen's obligation to pay
the interest.
Suppose Johnson feels that the judge in suit one incorrectly held that
Cohen was fraudulently induced to sign the note but recognized Cohen's
strong case against her on the waiver of paying interest. Through a
cost/benefit analysis, Johnson decides that an appeal would be useless
because Cohen would ultimately win on the issue of paying interest
because of the waiver. Since the cost and time of an appeal would not be
worth Johnson's eventual defeat, she does not seek an appeal.
Johnson then sues Cohen for the principal on the note in Johnson v.
Cohen H. Using the proposed amendment in this Note, the mere fact that
Johnson v. Cohen I was decided on multiple independent grounds does
not summarily mean that Cohen is prohibited from binding Johnson to
the decision of the first court that Cohen was fraudulently induced to
sign the note. 248 Instead, the burden will fall on Johnson to show either
that the issue of fraud was not fully developed in the first suit because
the evidence of a waiver was so compelling or that she did not foresee
that the issue of fraud would arise in a subsequent suit. In this
hypothetical, Johnson will have difficulty convincing a court that she
could not foresee a subsequent suit for the principal on the note.
These amendments address the main concerns of both Restatement
views. First, parties will not be encouraged to take cautionary appeals. 249
Only if it is sufficiently foreseeable that the issue will be the subject of
subsequent litigation will a party have an incentive to take a cautionary
appeal. If the issue will be the subject of subsequent litigation, then the
policy concern that matters are disposed of correctly and efficiently has
been achieved. 250 If Johnson does not have the incentive of the appeal
and cannot foresee relitigation of the issue, then judicial resources are
saved. 251 If, however, an appeal is in the party's best interest, or the issue
is likely to be the subject of future litigation, then she is given the

248 See supra Part V.A for the proposed additional exception under the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28.
249 See supra Part LV.B.
250 See supra Part IV.A.
251 See supra Part IV.A.
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opportunity and incentive to appeal. 252 Second, the courts will be secure
in consistent judgments and will avoid repetitious litigation of alreadydecided issues. 253 Erroneous determinations, as well as under-analyzed
issues, will not be perpetuated through the system because a party will
be able to argue to the second court that either the incentive to appeal or
the lack of analysis would lead to an injustice. Finally, Cohen has the
opportunity to assert all of the potential arguments on his side and be
confident that the resources expended in Johnson v. Cohen I will be well
spent.
VI. CONCLUSION

Issue preclusion, when applied to multiple independent holdings,
implicates the important element that an issue be "necessarily decided"
before being imputed against the party in subsequent litigation. This
Note examines the current circuit split among the federal appellate
courts and explains the several reasons why the present analysis under
both the First and Second Restatements infringes on litigation strategy,
incentive for appeal, and equitable results. Given the competing policy
concerns driving collateral estoppel and the inconsistent effects of the
current schools of thought, this Note suggests that the Restatement, and,
subsequently, the federal courts, should adopt the general rule of issue
preclusion and should allow an exception for multiple independent
holdings when a party who wants to avoid issue preclusion can prove an
injustice would result if collateral estoppel were invoked. As a result of
the amendment, parties will only take necessary appeals and are assured
full and rigorous analysis of the issue in the first court, and the number
of cases filed will decrease rather than increase, while consistent
judgments will prevail.
Monica Renee Brownewell*

252 See supra Part LV.B.

253 See supra Part 1V.C.
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